P L D 1966 Dacca 178 (PLP)

SAYEM, J.‑In this Rule the petitioner has challenged the validity of an order of the Provincial Government cancelling an allotment of a plot of land which stood in the name of the petitioner. Prayer has also been made for a direction on the Province to refrain from giving effect to the said order of cancellation and, to permit the petitioner to execute a deed of lease in respect of the allotted land, namely, Plot No. 539 of Dhanmandi Residential Area. It is not in dispute that the plot in question had earlier been allotted to Dr. Mrs. H. Sayeed, who paid the entire amount of premium and then suddenly died without executing the deed of lease, whereupon the allotment in her favour was cancelled. It is not also in dispute that upon such cancellation of the allot ment standing in the name of the late Dr. Mrs. H. Sayeed that the said plot was allotted to the petitioner who, in his turn, paid the premium and obtained sometime for execution of the lease. Before the expiry of that period, and before the deed of lease could be executed by the petitioner, Government cancelled the allotment in his favour. The petitioner thereupon obtained this Rule. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that he had a right in the allotment letter which could not be validly cancelled in the manner it was done, without granting the petitioner a hearing. In this connection reference has been made to illustration "C" of section 10 of the Specific Relief Act and section 55 (3) of the Transfer of Property Act which confers on certain persons the right to recover the possession of certain letters and documents. The learned Advocate‑General, on the other hand, points out that illustration C to section 10 of the Specific Relief Act or section 55 (3) of the Transfer of Property Act is not in any manner attracted to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as the allotment letter is admittedly in the possession of the petitioner. Besides, it is clear from the wordings of those provisions that they relate to completed transactions, which is not the case here. The learned Advocate General further contends that the petition is defective inasmuch as the heirs of late Dr. Mrs. H. Sayeed, ink whose favour the earlier allotment stood and to whose heirs it was restored, as stated in the affidavit‑in‑opposition, upon cancellation of the petitioner's allotment, have not been made parties. . There can be no doubt that if the impugned order cancelling the petitioner's allotment be quashed, the heirs of the late Dr. Mrs. H. Sayeed would be affected. The learned Advocate‑General has referred to the case Mosudul Hassan v. Khadim Hussain (PLD1963SC203) where their lordships of the Supreme Court expressed grave concern at the failure of the petitioner there to make persons .who would be affected by the result of the. Writ Petition parties therein. It was said that that fact alone could be a good ground for refusing the writ asked for. The learned Advocate‑General also referred in this connection to cases A I R 1957 Cal. 460, 62 C W N 384, A I R 1955 All.

106. It is true that the facts in the three cases last mentioned can be differentiated from the facts of the case before us. But the principle enunciated therein clearly lends support to the contention of the learned Advocate‑General. In the present case Mr. Khandkar made a verbal prayer for permission to add the heirs of the deceased Dr. Mrs. H. Sayeed, parties to the peti tion. We do not think that we should, at this stage and in the facts and circumstances disclosed in the affidavit‑in‑opposition, grant such a prayer. Besides, it appears to us that the allotment in question, namely that in favour of the petitioner, which has been cancelled by the impugned order, was a mere, offer by the Government which upon being accepted by the petitioner, and on payment of the premium and upon execution of a deed of lease would create a lease hold interest in the petitioner. It is true that the petitioner accepted the offer and paid the entire amount of premium, but the deed of lease was yet to be executed. The impugned cancellation older, therefore, was nothing but a refusal by Government to enter into a contract for lease with the petitioner. No final and conclusive right had accrued to the petitioner before the order of allotment in his favour was cancelled and, in. fact, Mr. Khondkar's claim is that by the impugned order of cancellation the petitioner was deprived of a right to execute a deed of lease and get a lease hold interest in the plot in question. It is clear from what we have stated above that it is a case of breach of contract or refusal to honour an obligation arising out of an acceptance by the petitioner of an offer or lease made by the Government. It is well established that a mere breach of contract or failure to honour an obligation arising out of such a contract cannot be enforced in the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Article 98 of the Constitution. The petition, therefore, is liable to be rejected. The Rule is accordingly discharged. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. A. S. CHOWDHURY, J.‑I agree. K. B. A. Rule discharged.