1986 PLP 369 (CLC)

TANZIL‑UR‑RAHMAN, J.‑‑These two High Court Appeals arise out of Judgment, dated 31‑8‑1982 passed in two suits bearing Nos. 638 and 639 of 1981, whereby a learned Single Judge has allowed the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.

2. There is no cavil for the learned counsel appearing before us that the period of limitation for filing the above suits will be three years. The point as urged by Mr. Khalilur Rehman, learned counsel for the appellants in both the appeals is whether the period of limitation will begin from 8‑10‑1978 as held by the learned Single Judge in the impugned Judgment on 18‑5‑1978 as contended by him. On perusal of the judgment and the material placed on the file, it appears that the respondents, in both the appeals, called upon the appellants by their letters, dated 2‑5‑1978 to execute the lease deeds in their favour in respect of the plots in question, which were subject‑matter of Lease Agreement dated 29‑7‑1971 in favour of Mirza Saeeduddin in H . C . A . No. 75 of 1982, and Lease Agreement, dated 31‑7‑1971 in favour of Mirza Ahtashamuddin in H . C . A . No. 76 of 1982. The appellants, for the first time, by their letter, dated 8‑10‑1978 refused to execute the said leases. The application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, was filed in this Court on 1‑10‑1981. So, the starting point of limitation as held by the learned Single Judge is 8‑10‑1978 and not 18‑5‑1978, when the allotment of plot was cancelled as urged by Mr. Khalilur Rehman, Advocate. The letter, dated 18‑5‑1978 for the alleged cancellation cannot be taken to be a starting point for limitation for the reasons that it has firstly, no reference to the request of the respondents as contained in their letters, dated 2‑5‑1978 for executing the Deed of Lease, and secondly, the alleged allotment is beyond the terms as agreed in the agreement of lease and has no relevance to it.

3. However, the purported cancellation of the allotments is of no consequence in so far as Article 113 or Article 181 of the Limitation Act is concerned. We would further like to state that Article 113 itself provides that the period of limitation of three years runs from the date fixed for performance of contract, and if no such date is fixed, it starts when the request for performance is refused. Admittedly no date for the performance of the Lease Agreements has been fixed therein. The limitation period will thus start from the date when the respondents received notice from the appellants and performance was refused, which is 8th of October, 1978, as rightly found by the learned Single Judge.

4. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in these Appeals which are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. H. B. T.??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Appeals dismissed.