SCMR 1990

1990 PLP 642 (SCMR)

Syed NISAR HAIDER‑‑Petitioner Versus Mst. RAZIA SULTANA‑‑Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.56‑K of 1989, decided on 15th February, 1989.
Honorable Judges
Muhammad Afzal Zillah and Zaffar Hussain Mirza, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1990 PLP 642 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Muhammad Afzal Zillah and Zaffar Hussain Mirza, JJ
Parties Syed NISAR HAIDER‑‑Petitioner Versus Mst. RAZIA SULTANA‑‑Respondent
Primary Law Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 642 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 642 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Muhammad Afzal Zillah and Zaffar Hussain Mirza, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 642 (SCMR) (Syed NISAR HAIDER‑‑Petitioner Versus Mst. RAZIA SULTANA‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑‑‑

Representation

  • S. S. Hamid, Advocate instructed by M. A.1. Qarni, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
  • Abdul Khair, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 15th February, 1989.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the judgment dated 13th November, 1988 of High Court, Sindh in F.R. A. No.617 of 1987). ‑‑‑S.15‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)‑‑‑Tenant's eviction‑‑ Justification‑‑‑Landlady had sought eviction of tenant on account of bona fide need related to her old age and ill health, so that her married daughter could occupy the premises and be available to be of service to her, in case of need‑‑ Landlady could seek the eviction of tenant for the use of her daughter but she had not concealed the truth‑‑‑Landlady's need to accommodate her daughter to be of service to her in case of need, appeared to be mutual which the law does not prohibit‑‑‑Not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal‑‑‑Leave refused.

Judgment & Decree

Abdul Khair, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent. Date of hearing: 15th February, 1989. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑Leave to appeal has been sought by a tenant against the dismissal by the High Court, of his first rent appeal which had arisen out of an order of eviction passed by a learned Rent Controller on the ground of personal need of the respondent/landlady. The statement of the learned counsel for the petitioner needs to be noticed here that while deciding the matter the High Court on respondent/ landlady's appeal also rendered a judgment against the petitioner on the question of default in payment of rent. According to learned counsel the respondent/landlady is occupying the ground floor of the house while the first floor is with the petitioner. She claimed that first floor was also required by her on account of her illness and old age so that her married daughter should occupy the same and be available to be of service to her mother, the respondent herein, in case of need. Learned counsel tried to show that such a need is not visualised by the law nor would it be treated as bona fide because according to him respondent could accommodate her daughter on the ground floor so that she should be more near to her as compared to be on the first floor to assist her. After hearing the learned counsel we are satisfied that the respondent /landlady has sought the eviction of the petitioner on account of bona fide need related to her old age and ill health. Otherwise too she could seek the eviction of the petitioner for the use of her daughter but she has not concealed the truth. The need it appears is 'mutual. The law does not prohibit it. In this view of the matter we do not consider it a fit case for grant of leave to appeal. The question of personal need having been decided against the petitioner, there is no need to further examine the question of default. This l petition accordingly stands dismissed. AA./N‑195/S Petition dismissed.