SCMR 1990

1990 PLP 635 (SCMR)

Messrs FATIMA EXPORT CORPORATION and another‑‑Petitioners Versus HABIB BANK Ltd.‑‑Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.104 of 1985, decided on 6th March, 1989.
Honorable Judges
Muhammad Afzal Zullah arid S. Usman Ali Shah, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1990 PLP 635 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Muhammad Afzal Zullah arid S. Usman Ali Shah, JJ
Parties Messrs FATIMA EXPORT CORPORATION and another‑‑Petitioners Versus HABIB BANK Ltd.‑‑Respondent
Primary Law Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1990 PLP 635 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1990 PLP 635 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Muhammad Afzal Zullah arid S. Usman Ali Shah, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1990 PLP 635 (SCMR) (Messrs FATIMA EXPORT CORPORATION and another‑‑Petitioners Versus HABIB BANK Ltd.‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Limitation Act (IX of 1908)‑‑‑

Representation

  • Sh.Hamid Mukhtar, Advocate and S.Abid Nawaz, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.
  • Nemo for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 6th March, 1989. .

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the order of the Lahore High Court, dated 22nd October, 1984 in R.FA. No.204 of 1981). ‑‑‑S.14‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)‑‑‑First appeal before High Court against ex parte decree filed beyond period of limitation‑‑‑No grounds made out for exclusion of excess period‑‑‑Grounds for condoning the delay whether justifiable‑‑‑Narration of facts and the dates in the impugned order would make it absolutely clear that the relevant period could not be claimed as an exclusion under S.14 of Limitation Act, regardless of the fact whether the defendants' counsel was negligent or not in tendering right or wrong advice‑‑‑If it be assumed that the petitioners were given wrong advice by the counsel, such fact would not be sufficient cause for condonation by itself‑‑‑Conduct of defendants themselves, apart from what their counsel advised, was otherwise not such that it would have merited condonation of delay‑‑‑Looked at from whatever angle there was not force in the petition‑‑‑Leave refused.

Judgment & Decree

Sh.Hamid Mukhtar, Advocate and S.Abid Nawaz, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 6th March, 1989. . MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑‑Leave to appeal has been sought from dismissal by the High Court of petitioners' Regular First Appeal, which had arisen out of a decree passed against them by a Banking Court. The case had earlier been brought before this Court. It was remanded to the High Court for fresh decision; as to whether, the ex parte decree passed against the petitioners on 6‑7‑1981 was sustainable on merits; and whether, the petitioners' first appeal before the High Court against that decree, as distinguished from the order refusing to set aside the order for proceeding ex parte, was within time. After the remand the learned Division Bench, in elaborate order dealt with the question of limitation and after noticing all the relevant material including dates in this behalf, came to the conclusion that there was no question of the exclusion of the excess period claimed in that behalf. It has also been held that there was no justifiable ground for condoning the delay. The narration of the facts and the dates in the impugned order makes it absolutely clear that the relevant period could not be claimed as an exclusion under section 14 of the Limitation Act regardless of the fact whether the petitioner's counsel was negligent or not in tendering right or wrong advice. On the second point if it is assumed that the petitioners were given wrong advice by the counsel, this in the circumstances of the case would, as held by the High Court, not be sufficient cause for condonation by itself. Otherwise too the conduct of the petitioners themselves, apart from what their counsel advised, is not such that it would have merited condonation in question. Looked at from whatever angle there is no force in this petition. Leave to appeal is refused. A.A./F‑133/5 Leave refused.