P L D 1991 Lahore 415 (PLP)
DOST MUHAMMAD alias DOOSO — Appellant Versus THE STATE — Respondent
| Citation | P L D 1991 Lahore 415 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | DOST MUHAMMAD alias DOOSO — Appellant Versus THE STATE — Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1991 Lahore 415 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1991 Lahore 415 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1991 Lahore 415 (PLP) (DOST MUHAMMAD alias DOOSO — Appellant Versus THE STATE — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Headnotes / Summary
S. 13-A
Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act (XV of 1975), Ss. 7 &. 8
Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Rules, 1975, R.6(2)
Order of conviction passed by the Special Court manifestly showed that accused had not received fair trial, rather was virtually condemned unheard and sentenced to 7 years' R.I. and a fine of Rs.95,000 without there being single word of evidence against him
Special Court had not mentioned as to under what law it had recorded conviction of accused and sentenced him to a severe punishment and had grossly misconceived the import of law relating to presumption of guilt against the accused
Held, such presumption would arise only when the prosecution had brought on record some evidence against the accused prima facie showing that accused had 'committed the crime charged against him and in the absence of any such evidence no presumption of guilt could have arisen against the accused
Such order of Trial Court being patently illegal was not sustainable in law
Case was remanded for retrial according to law. [p. 417] A
S. 8
Such presumption would arise only when the prosecution had brought on record some evidence against the accused prima facie showing that accused had committed the crime charged against him and in the absence of any such evidence no presumption of guilt could have arisen againsl the accused.--[Presumption]. [p. 417) A
Counsel for accused who was not fully prepare( sought adjournment for a couple of days which would not have made am difference and if the Trial Court thought that such an adjournment was not in th( interest of justice, it, instead of passing the final order of conviction and sentence should have proceeded to record the prosecution evidence giving an opportunit; to the accused of cross-examining the witnesses. Accused might or might not hav availed of that opportunity was another question but at least there would have been material on record to prima facie establish the guilt of the accused--;.By na
Judgment & Decree
S. 13-A
Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act (XV of 1975), Ss. 7 &. 8
Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Rules, 1975, R.6(2)
Order of conviction passed by the Special Court manifestly showed that accused had not received fair trial, rather was virtually condemned unheard and sentenced to 7 years' R.I. and a fine of Rs.95,000 without there being single word of evidence against him
Special Court had not mentioned as to under what law it had recorded conviction of accused and sentenced him to a severe punishment and had grossly misconceived the import of law relating to presumption of guilt against the accused
Held, such presumption would arise only when the prosecution had brought on record some evidence against the accused prima facie showing that accused had 'committed the crime charged against him and in the absence of any such evidence no presumption of guilt could have arisen against the accused
Such order of Trial Court being patently illegal was not sustainable in law
Case was remanded for retrial according to law. [p. 417] A (b) Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act (XV of 1975)
S. 8
Such presumption would arise only when the prosecution had brought on record some evidence against the accused prima facie showing that accused had committed the crime charged against him and in the absence of any such evidence no presumption of guilt could have arisen againsl the accused.--[Presumption]. [p. 417) A (c) Criminal trial
Counsel for accused who was not fully prepare( sought adjournment for a couple of days which would not have made am difference and if the Trial Court thought that such an adjournment was not in th( interest of justice, it, instead of passing the final order of conviction and sentence should have proceeded to record the prosecution evidence giving an opportunit; to the accused of cross-examining the witnesses. Accused might or might not hav availed of that opportunity was another question but at least there would have been material on record to prima facie establish the guilt of the accused--;.By na adopting such procedure by the Trial Court, it had flouted all the norms of fair trial and principles of natural justice
Rushing through criminal cases, involving life and liberty of individuals was deprecated by High Court with observation that when cases were disposed of in such a hasty manner merely to exhibit needless proficiency it would not create a good impression in the minds of public, rather their confidence in the Courts of law would be irretrievably shaken and the noble purpose with which laws were promulgated, would grievously be frustrated. [p. 417) B Malik Dost Muhammad Awan for Appellant A. A.-G. for the State. Date of hearing: 8th July, 1,991.