1971 PLP 144 (PLC)

It is true that the Collective Bargaining Agent has a fight to raise an industrial dispute. The right to raise an industrial dispute is, however, quite distinct from an indus trial dispute arising out of any right, guaranteed under any law. The industrial dispute which the Collective Bargaining. Agent can rise under section 34 of the Ordinance, must relate to any right, which has been guaranteed under any law for the time being in force or arises out of an award or settlement. Masud Mirza for Appellant. S. P. Lodi for Respondent. No. 1 Date of hearing: 7th October 1970. This is an appeal against an order of the 1st Sind Labour Court, Karachi, dated 12th September 1970; the impugned order was passed on an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). The facts giving rise .to the appeal briefly put are these.

2. The Pakistan Radio House Employees' Union, Karachi, gave a notice under section 26 of the Ordinance on 29th January 1970, .to Messrs Pakistan Radio House Limited, Karachi, intimating the likelihood of an industrial dispute between the parties. The parties having failed - to come to a settlement, the parties gave a strike notice on 26th April 1970, raising a number of demands. The Union did not consider it feasible to go on strike. On the other hand it made an application under section 34 of the Ordinance on 4th July 1970, for adjudication of the demands, which are given in paragraph 2 of the application. The demands, as would appear from paragraph 2, of the application relate to grade, Salary; Increment, Bonus, Gratuity, Leave, Pro vident Fund, Medical facilities, as given in Annexure `A` to the application. A preliminary objection was taken before the learned Court that the application under section 34 of the Ordinance was not maintainable, inasmuch as, there was no industrial dispute pending, as the workers had not gone on strike. Before the learned Court, as would appear from the order, the Representative of the appellant did not dispute "the applicability of the other conditions of section 34 of the Ordinance" The, learned Court came to the conclusion that the industrial dispute was in existence and the other ingredients of section 34 of the Ordinance having not been challenged before him, the Court ordered that the application was maintainable.

3. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Representatives of the parties, it would be useful to reproduce section 34 of the Ordinance It runs as under: Any party to an industrial dispute relating to a matter arising out of any right guaranteed or secured to an employer or workman by or under any law for the time being in force, or an award or settlement may apply to the Labour Court -for adjudication of the dispute." From a perusal of section 34 of the Ordinance is abundantly clear that it is not all industrial disputes which can be -raised) under section 34 of the Ordinance. Section 34 of the Ordinance is limited in its scope. The industrial dispute, which can be the subject-matter of section 34 of the Ordinance, must arise oral of any right guaranteed or secured to an employer or workman by or under any law for the time being in force or an ward or settlement. The learned Representative for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the respondent had a right to raise an industrial dispute under the Ordinance and, therefore, his application is maintainable. There is not much force in this, contention. It is true that the Collective Bargaining Agent has a right to raise an industrial dispute. The right to raise an, industrial dispute is, however, quite distinct from an industrial dispute arising out of any right guaranteed under any law. As I have already observed, the scope of section 34 of the Ordinance is limited. It is not all industrial disputes, which can form the subject-matter of section 34 of the Ordinance. The industrial dispute, which the Collective Bargaining Agent can raise under section 34 of the Ordinance, must relate to any right that has been guaranteed under any law for the time being in force or C arises out of an award or settlement. Mr. S. P. Lodhi, the learned Representative for the respondent was unable to show that any of the demands, which formed the subject-matter of the application, had arisen out of any right guaranteed or secured by or under any law or bad arisen out of an award or settlement. In that view of the matter, I would set aside the order of the learned Court and hold that the application under section 34 of the Ordinance is not maintainable.