P (PLP)

Constantine J.

‑The appellant, Mulchand, who is represented by the Court of Wards, is the minor son of one 1ldhomal, who was together with the respondent, Bheromal, a shah partner in a firm. After the death of Udhomal a suit was filed by the appellant for partnership accounts, in which Bherumal and the Gumasta partners were joined. A preliminary decree was passed and then reference to the Commissioner was made. Both Mulchand and Bherumal filed objections to tire Commissioner's report. The matter was disposed of by the learned judge, and from his judgment we have this appeal as well as the connected appeal by Bherumal. In Mulchand's appeal the point briefly is that the final decree gives to the plaintiff sums from Bherumal and from defendants 2, 3 and 4, who were the Gumashta partners. It is argued by Mr. Lulla that these Gumashta partners are men of straw and hence the risk that they will not be able to reimburse Mulchand should be borne by Bherumal the other shah partner also. The partnership deed showed that Bherumai and Udhomal were to have a share together of nine annas and the gumashta partners were to have as sham of seven arenas. Clause 10, which contains this provision, also sub‑divide re of the gumashta partners, but contains no sub‑division of the share of the shah partners. But the preliminary decree itself directed accounts should be taken on the basis that the shares of Udhomal and defendant No. 1 were separate, and Fence we do not think that reliance can be placed upon clause 10 in order to support an argument that the correct way of working out the accounts would have been to work liability of the gumashta partners as against the shah partners jointly. Mr. Lulla also argued that in order to have equality between the two shah partners, there must be some clause whereby if Mulchand failed t to recover fro n the Gumashta partners, then that failure should become a loss to be borne not merely by pin but by Bherumal also. We think, however, that is not possible. Carrying this principle to its logical conclusion, if you have a firm with several partners, the permutations and combinations to this effect would be astronomical. Mr. Keshowdas has cited Garner v. Murray, (1904) 1 Ch. 57, there is an observation in that case with reference to S. 44 of the English Act correspond ing to S. 46, Indian Partnership Act: " I do note find anything to that section to make a solvent partner liable to contribute for an insolvent partner who fails to pay his share." For these reasons, therefore, the appeal of Mulchand should be dismissed. In the companion appeal by Bherumal no point of principle is in volved. The result is 'that both the appeals are dismissed wit costs. M. A. Appeals dismissed