SCMR 1968

1968 PLP 1390 (SCMR)

THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, LAHORE‑Petitioner Versus MESSRS RAVI TEXTILE AND CARPET Co., LAHORE‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeals Nos. 68 and 69 of 1967, decided on 5th December 1967.
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1968 PLP 1390 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members N/A
Parties THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, LAHORE‑Petitioner Versus MESSRS RAVI TEXTILE AND CARPET Co., LAHORE‑Respondents
Primary Law C. P. S. L. A. No. 68 of 1967, Supreme Courts Rules, 1956,, C. P. S. L. A. No. 69 of 1967
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1968 PLP 1390 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: C. P. S. L. A. No. 68 of 1967, Supreme Courts Rules, 1956,, C. P. S. L. A. No. 69 of 1967 as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1968 PLP 1390 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1968 PLP 1390 (SCMR) (THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME‑TAX, LAHORE‑Petitioner Versus MESSRS RAVI TEXTILE AND CARPET Co., LAHORE‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

C. P. S. L. A. No. 68 of 1967 Supreme Courts Rules, 1956, C. P. S. L. A. No. 69 of 1967

Representation

  • Abdul Haque, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (Mushtaq Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by M. B. Khizar Tamimi, Senior Attorney for Petitioner.
  • Nemo for Respondents.
  • Abdul Haque, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (No junior counsel with him) instructed by M. Z. Khalil, Attorney for Petitioner.
  • Nemo for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing : 5th December 1967.

Headnotes / Summary

‑ (On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dated the 17th January 1967, in Civil Miscellaneous Nos. 67‑S and 73‑S of 1966, respectively).

O. XIII, r. 1 and Constitution of .Pakistan (1962), Art. 58(3)‑Petition for Special Leave to Appeal Starting point of limitation :date of judgment appealed against‑ Petition barred by time‑Mere fact that petitioners, were Govern ment Departments‑No special indulgence can be shown as compared with ordinary litigants‑Petitions dismissed as barred by time. AND ORDER S. A. RAHMAN, J.‑These two petitions filed on behalf of the Commissioner of Incometax, Lahore Zone and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Rawalpindi Region, are both barred by time, the former by one year and 49 days and the latter by one year and 53 days. In the first case, the impugned decision of the High Court was rendered on the 3rd November 1965. A copy of the judgment was applied for and received on the 22nd December 1965. On the 12th January 1966, an application was moved before the High Court for a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court under section 66‑A of the Incometax Act. This applica tion was dismissed on the 17th January 1967. The petition was however, lodged with this Court on the 21st of February 1967. Under Order XIII, rule 1 of the Rules of this Court, the starting point of the limitation was the date of the judgment appealed against, namely, the 3rd November 1965, and the petitioner had 60 days to present the petition for special leave. Even if the time spent in obtaining a refusal of a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court be excluded up to the 17th January 1967, there is no satisfactory explanation furnished for the delay between the 17th January 1967, and the 21st February 1967. In the second case, the Civil Reference was decided by the High Court on the 1st November 1965. A copy of the judgment was applied for on the 1st November 1965, and it was actually obtained on the 22nd December 1965. It is not explained why the copy was not received earlier. A certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court was applied for in the High Court on the 12th January 1966. Here again it is not explained why so much time was taken to move this application. Be that as it may, the application was dismissed by the High Court on the 17th January 1967. It is then stated that an application for a certified copy of the High Court's order dismissing the applica tion. was made on the 19th January. 1967, and the copy delivered on the 30th January 1967, but that no intimation was sent by the counsel to the Department till the 4th of February 1967. This delay is absolutely unexplained. Application for special leave to appeal was made to this Court on the 23rd February 1967 and here again the delay remains without a satisfactory explanation. Even, therefore, allowing for the time spent in obtaining a refusal of a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court, it is not shown that due diligence was exercised in approaching this Court. The mere fact that the petitioners are Government Depart ments does not entitle them to special indulgence in this respect, as compared with ordinary litigants. The respondents have gained valuable civil rights in the meantime which should not be lightly interfered with. We, therefore, dismiss both the petitions as time barred. Petition dismissed as barred by time.

Judgment & Decree

S. A. RAHMAN, J.‑These two petitions filed on behalf of the Commissioner of Incometax, Lahore Zone and the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Rawalpindi Region, are both barred by time, the former by one year and 49 days and the latter by one year and 53 days. In the first case, the impugned decision of the High Court was rendered on the 3rd November 1965. A copy of the judgment was applied for and received on the 22nd December 1965. On the 12th January 1966, an application was moved before the High Court for a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court under section 66‑A of the Incometax Act. This applica tion was dismissed on the 17th January 1967. The petition was however, lodged with this Court on the 21st of February 1967. Under Order XIII, rule 1 of the Rules of this Court, the starting point of the limitation was the date of the judgment appealed against, namely, the 3rd November 1965, and the petitioner had 60 days to present the petition for special leave. Even if the time spent in obtaining a refusal of a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court be excluded up to the 17th January 1967, there is no satisfactory explanation furnished for the delay between the 17th January 1967, and the 21st February 1967. In the second case, the Civil Reference was decided by the High Court on the 1st November 1965. A copy of the judgment was applied for on the 1st November 1965, and it was actually obtained on the 22nd December 1965. It is not explained why the copy was not received earlier. A certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court was applied for in the High Court on the 12th January 1966. Here again it is not explained why so much time was taken to move this application. Be that as it may, the application was dismissed by the High Court on the 17th January 1967. It is then stated that an application for a certified copy of the High Court's order dismissing the applica tion. was made on the 19th January. 1967, and the copy delivered on the 30th January 1967, but that no intimation was sent by the counsel to the Department till the 4th of February 1967. This delay is absolutely unexplained. Application for special leave to appeal was made to this Court on the 23rd February 1967 and here again the delay remains without a satisfactory explanation. Even, therefore, allowing for the time spent in obtaining a refusal of a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court, it is not shown that due diligence was exercised in approaching this Court. The mere fact that the petitioners are Government Depart ments does not entitle them to special indulgence in this respect, as compared with ordinary litigants. The respondents have gained valuable civil rights in the meantime which should not be lightly interfered with. We, therefore, dismiss both the petitions as time barred. Petition dismissed as barred by time.