1995 PLP 216 (MLD)
KHALIL AHMAD‑‑‑Petitioner Versus Mst. RIAZ BIBI and another‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1995 PLP 216 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Ausaf Ali A an, J |
| Parties | KHALIL AHMAD‑‑‑Petitioner Versus Mst. RIAZ BIBI and another‑‑‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1995 PLP 216 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1995 PLP 216 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Ausaf Ali A an, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1995 PLP 216 (MLD) (KHALIL AHMAD‑‑‑Petitioner Versus Mst. RIAZ BIBI and another‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Sohail Mahmood Qureshi for Petitioner.
- Malik Muhammad Aslam for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑‑S.5 & Sched.‑‑‑Dissolution of marriage on grounds of exercising right of option of puberty and Khula'‑‑‑Plaintiff (wife) who filed suit for dissolution of marriage against defendant (husband) on grounds of exercising her right of option of puberty and Khula` was successful in proving through irrefutable testimony of natural witness that she was married to defendant forcibly; that she did never accept that Nikah; that defendant was quite an old man; and that defendant had levelled a false charge of adultery against her‑‑‑Plaintiff, in such circumstances had naturally developed aversion against defendant in her mind‑‑‑As for specified amount allegedly given by defendant to father of plaintiff, with a view to having her hand in marriage, plaintiff who was not party to that bargain, could not be held responsible for its return to defendant‑‑‑Marriage having not been consummated between parties, no question of Iddat arose at the incidence of the separation‑‑‑Plaintiff had since contracted a second marriage‑‑‑Trial Court, in circumstances, had rightly dissolved marriage and judgment of Trial Court could not be interfered with.
Judgment & Decree
Malik Muhammad Aslam for Respondents. This writ petition is directed against the judgment dated the 29th of April 1993, of the learned Judge Family Court, Bahawalpur, whereby he decreed the plaintiff's suit for dissolution of marriage.
2. The plaintiff Mst. Riaz Bibi brought a suit for dissolution of her marriage with the petitioner‑defendant Khalil Ahmed on the grounds of exercising her right of option of puberty and alternatively Khula`. The petitioner contested the suit.
3. Both the parties adduced their respective evidence. The trial Court was impressed with the evidence brought on the record by the respondent. Consequently, it separated the marriage tie between the parties.
4. The petitioner has assailed the decree in this Constitutional petition.
5. I have gone through tile pleadings as also the evidence of the parties with the assistance of learned counsel for them. The respondent‑wife was successful in proving her case by producing irrefutable testimony of natural witnesses who deposed that the respondent was married to the petitioner forcibly; that s she did never accept the Nikah; that the petitioner was quite an old man; and that he had levelled false charge of adultery against her. In this milieu it was but natural for the respondent to develop aversion against the petitioner in her mind.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent has not returned the benefits extended by him. There is no evidence or for that matter any plea having been taken in the pleading of the petitioner that he had afforded any benefit to her. In fact, he had given a sum of about thirty thousand of rupees to her father and grandfather with a view to having her hand in marriage. The respondent was .not a party to this bargain and she cannot be held responsible for its return to him. As regards consideration for Khula`, it may be stated that the marriage was not consummated between the parties and,, therefore, no question of Iddat arose at the incidence of the separation. Further, the respondent has since contracted a second marriage and that too before the institution of the present writ petition. Hence, the claim of the petitioner to set aside the judgment of the learned trial Court seems absurd which by no canons of justice be acceded to.
7. For what has been discussed above, the writ petition is dismissed having no merit at all. H.B.T./K‑150/L Petition dismissed.