PLC 1999

1999 PLP 388 (PLC)

Messrs ARMY WELFARE SUGAR MILLS Versus RASOOL BUX TALPUR

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh
Decided Date
Appeal No. HYD-113 of 1997, decided on 14th April, 1999.
Honorable Judges
Dr. Tanzilur Rahman, Chairman
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1999 PLP 388 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh
Bench Members Dr. Tanzilur Rahman, Chairman
Parties Messrs ARMY WELFARE SUGAR MILLS Versus RASOOL BUX TALPUR
Primary Law Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1999 PLP 388 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1999 PLP 388 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh bench comprising: Dr. Tanzilur Rahman, Chairman.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1999 PLP 388 (PLC) (Messrs ARMY WELFARE SUGAR MILLS Versus RASOOL BUX TALPUR). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)

Representation

  • M. Sadiq Quraishi for Appellant.
  • Hamid Hussain for Respondent.
  • 3. I have heard Mr. M. Sadiq Quraishi learned advocate for the appellant and Mr. Hamid Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent.
  • 9. In view of the above, the respondent may report for duty to the appellant. Mr: Sadiq, learned advocate for the appellant, undertakes to inform his client by writing a letter to them.

Headnotes / Summary

S. 25-A

Resignation under duress

Proof

Re-instatement in service-- Employee who was relieved from service had alleged that his resignation was obtained under duress

Question of duress was a pure question of fact which had fully been proved and employer had failed to produce evidence in rebuttal

Employer having failed to prove that employee had tendered his resignation voluntarily without any coercion or duress, for domestic reasons, employee was rightly re-instated in service.

Judgment & Decree

2. The facts, giving rise to the above appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent was employed as Upper Division Clerk on 1‑12‑1983. He was promoted as Store Keeper on 15th December. 1990 where, as alleged by the respondent, the Stores Officer became annoyed with him and consequently obtained his resignation under duress on 6‑12‑1994. It was thus alleged that he was forced to resign by the Stores Officer. He, thereupon. immediately went to the General Secretary of the Collective Bargaining Agent and apprised him about the said incident. The General Secretary talked to the General Manager of the appellant, who assured that the resignation, tendered by the respondent, will not be accepted and that the respondent may continue to work in the Store. The applicant continued working, when, all of a sudden, on 17‑12‑1994, the respondent was stopped to enter in his office and was verbally informed that his resignation has been accepted and that he was no more in the service of the appellant. The respondent sent a grievance notice which was replied. The notice and reply are on record (pages 13 and 15). Thereafter, the respondent filed a grievance petition under section 25‑A of the I.R.O., 1969 in the Sindh Labour Court No.6, at Hyderabad. The learned Presiding Officer, after recording the evidence of both the parties and hearing the learned counsel for the parties, allowed the said grievance application reinstating the respondent with 50% back benefits. It is against this decision, that the above appeal has been filed by the appellant.

3. I have heard Mr. M. Sadiq Quraishi learned advocate for the appellant and Mr. Hamid Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent.

4. Mr. Sadiq submits that the respondent did not produce any evidence documentary or oral, to prove his allegation that he had any difference with the Stores Officer and that his resignation was obtained under duress by the said Stores Officer. On the other hand Mr. Hamid Hussain submits that it is a case of no evidence on behalf of the appellant, as the person, who was examined on behalf of the appellant. Major (Rtd.) Asad Raza, the Labour Welfare Officer, had no knowledge about the incident or meet the allegation of the respondent that the resignation was obtained under duress from him by Mr. Afridi, the Stores Officer. Admittedly the Stores Officer was in the service of the appellant who was not examined as a witness. The learned Presiding Officer seems to be justified in drawing adverse inference against the appellant. The whole story revolves between the Stores Officer and the respondent. Mr. Hamid Hussain submits that no order of acceptance of resignation has been produced in the Labour Court nor any order was passed by the General Manager who is a competent authority to hire and fire has neither been produced in the Labour Court nor confronted to the respondent.

5. In fact, the appellant's witness Major (Rtd.) Asad has admitted in the crossexamination that it is the General Manager alone who is a competent authority to accept the resignation.

6. As regards the incident, the respondent has examined the General Secretary of the C.B.A. Union, who has stated in his affidavit‑in‑evidence that on 6‑12‑1994 at 11 a.m. the respondent came to him and narrated about the incident. He then immediately saw the General Manager, who told him that the respondent should continue his work and that his resignation will not be accepted. This statement, made by the General Secretary of the C.B.A. Union, is supported by the very fact that the respondent continued working as Store Keeper till 17‑12‑1994, when he was stopped to enter in the office saying that his resignation has been accepted and that he was no more in the service. On this part specifically stated by the General Secretary of the C.B.A. Union that the respondent immediately called on him and he went to the General Manager and conveyed the message of the General Manager to the respondent, he was not at all cross‑examined. The learned counsel for the appellants submission that he had stated in the cross -examination that he had no knowledge whether the respondent filed any complaint to the General Manager or to the Personnel Manager. This statement made by the General Secretary of the Union, is specific on the point of bringing by the respondent the incident to the notice of the General Manager or the Personnel Manager. The fact however, remains that the respondent tendered resignation on 6‑12‑1994 and as alleged by him, it was under duress. The resignation is on record. There is no other documentary evidence to show the resignation has been accepted or not by the General Manager, who, according to the witness of the appellant himself, is the only competent authority to accept the resignation. The question of duress is a qure question of fact. There is no evidence in rebuttal. There is a failure on the part of the appellant to produce the concerned officer about whom an allegation of tussle between the appellant and the respondent was alleged and that the resignation was obtained by him under duress, as such, I agree with the submission of Mr. Hamid Hussain that it is a case of no evidence in rebuttal of the allegation of the respondent.

7. Mr. Sadiq lastly submits that grievance notice has been given by the respondent after about two months on 25‑2‑1995. However, it may be noticed that the law provides period of three months, as such, no exception can be taken. This plea will not be sufficient to accept the assertion of the appellant that the respondent tendered his resignation voluntarily without any coercion or duress, for domestic reasons.

8. I, therefore, find no force in the appeal, which is dismissed accordingly.

9. In view of the above, the respondent may report for duty to the appellant. Mr: Sadiq, learned advocate for the appellant, undertakes to inform his client by writing a letter to them. Announced in open Court, this the 14th day of April, 1999. H.B.T./251/K/Lab.(Trib) Appeal dismissed.