1995 PLP 1151 (SCMR)
JAVED NAWAZ‑‑‑Petitioner Versus THE STATE‑‑‑Respondent
| Citation | 1995 PLP 1151 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | Supreme Court of Pakistan |
| Bench Members | Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, Fazal Ilahi Khan and |
| Parties | JAVED NAWAZ‑‑‑Petitioner Versus THE STATE‑‑‑Respondent |
| Primary Law | Penal Code (XLV of 1860)‑‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1995 PLP 1151 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1995 PLP 1151 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, Fazal Ilahi Khan and.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1995 PLP 1151 (SCMR) (JAVED NAWAZ‑‑‑Petitioner Versus THE STATE‑‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Raja Muhammad Anwar, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
- Date of hearing: 21st December, 1993.
- Raja Muhammad Akram, Advocate Supreme Court and Ejaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate‑on‑Record for the State.
- We have heard Raja Muhammad Anwar, Advocate, for the petitioner; Raja Muhammad Akram, Advocate, for the respondent/State; and have perused the record of the case.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment dated 30‑10‑1993 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. A. No. 861/90). ‑‑‑‑S. 365‑A‑‑‑Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act (XV of 1975), S. 4‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Arts. 89 & 185(3)‑‑‑Petition for leave to appeal‑‑‑Contention was that amending Ordinances I of 1990 and XI of 1990 amending the Schedule of Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 to include S. 365‑A, P.P.C. had lapsed and at the time of submission of challan S.365‑A, P.P.C. having ceased to be a scheduled offence, Special Court had no jurisdiction to try the case and that an Ordinance having lapsed could not be re‑promulgated‑‑‑Held, High Court had rightly rejected the said contention relying on the verdict of Supreme Court in case "Muhammad Naeem v. The State" (1992 SCMR 1617) holding that retrospective effect could be given to the re‑introduced Ordinance from an earlier date, which was still holding the field and was binding on all the Courts in Pakistan‑‑‑Section 365‑A, P.P.C. being a part of the Schedule on the date of passing the conviction and sentence on the accused, was therefore, exclusively triable by the Special Court‑‑‑Leave to appeal was refused in circumstances. Akhtar Hussain v. The State 1993 SCMR 1522; Liaqat Pervaiz Khan v. Government of the Punjab PLD 1992 Lah. 517 and Muhammad Naeem v. The State 1992 SCMR 1617 ref. Raja Muhammad Akram, Advocate Supreme Court and Ejaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate‑on‑Record for the State.
Judgment & Decree
Akhtar Hussain v. The State 1993 SCMR 1522; Liaqat Pervaiz Khan v. Government of the Punjab PLD 1992 Lah. 517 and Muhammad Naeem v. The State 1992 SCMR 1617 ref. Raja Muhammad Anwar, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner. Raja Muhammad Akram, Advocate Supreme Court and Ejaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate‑on‑Record for the State. Date of hearing: 21st December, 1993. WALI MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.‑‑‑Javed Nawaz, petitioner herein, calls in question the judgment dated 30‑10‑1993 whereby a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court rejected the preliminary objections raised by tire petitioner. We have heard Raja Muhammad Anwar, Advocate, for the petitioner; Raja Muhammad Akram, Advocate, for the respondent/State; and have perused the record of the case. The undisputed facts of the case are that the petitioner alongwith his co‑accused were tried by the Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act, 1975 for allegedly abducting Shaikh Muhammad Aftab on 22‑4‑1990 is case F.I.R. No. 192 dated 22‑4‑1990 Police Station Gulberg, Lahore, convicted under section 365‑A, P.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment and forfeiture of property in favour of State. An appeal bearing No. 861 of 1990 was filed before the High Court under section 7 of Act XV of 1975 and during the hearing of the appeal a preliminary objection was raised that though at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, Ordinance I of 1990 promulgated on 17‑3‑1990 included section 365‑A, P.P.C. to the Schedule of Offences but since the same was not placed before the National Assembly under the mandatory provision of the Constitution, it lapsed on 16‑7‑1990 and at the time of submission of challan on 20‑9‑1990 section 365‑A having ceased to be a scheduled offence, the Special Court constituted under the Ordinance had no jurisdiction to try the case. Ordinance XI of 1990 was promulgated on 31‑10‑1990 amending the Schedule to include section 356‑A, P.P.C. which also lapsed on 2‑2‑1991 but section 2 thereof contained a deeming clause, according to which, the amendment was deemed to have been so inserted on the 3rd of September, 1989. The conviction and sentence of the appellant was ordered on 22‑11‑1990 when section 365‑A, P.P.C. was part of the Schedule and exclusively triable by the Special Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that under the spirit of Article 89 of the Constitution an Ordinance having lapsed could not be re‑promulgated and in support of his contention he cited the judgment of this Court in Akhtar Hussain v. The State (1993 SCMR 1522) whereby leave was granted to consider the important Constitutional points involved. The learned High Court, besides relying on the judgment of the Lahore. High Court in Liaqat Pervaiz Khan v. Government of the Punjab (PLD 1992 Lahore 517) also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in case Muhammad Naeem v. The State (1992 SCMR 1617) in which, more or less, identical legal points were involved and it was held that retrospective effect could be given to the re‑introduced Ordinance from an earlier date. The said judgment of this Court is still holding the field and so long as it is not dissented from in a later judgment by a larger Bench, is binding on, all the Courts in Pakistan under Article 189 of the Constitution. In the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner only leave to appeal has been granted as the point agitated involved question of general legal importance and interpretation of the provision of the Constitution and so long as authoritative judgment is not pronounced, one way or the other, the earlier judgments of this Court shall remain in force. Consequently, there is no merit in the instant petition and the same is dismissed. N.H.Q./J‑128/S ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Leave refused.