CLD 2005

2005 PLP 1654 (CLD)

HABIB BANK LIMITED — Appellant Versus AWAN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and others — Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2005 PLP 1654 (CLD)
Forum / Court Lahore
Bench Members N/A
Parties HABIB BANK LIMITED — Appellant Versus AWAN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and others — Respondents
Primary Law Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2005 PLP 1654 (CLD)?

This judgment primarily cites: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2005 PLP 1654 (CLD)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2005 PLP 1654 (CLD) (HABIB BANK LIMITED — Appellant Versus AWAN TEXTILE MILLS LIMITED through Chief Executive and others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)

Headnotes / Summary

Ss. 9 & 22

Suit for recovery of loan

Appeal to High Court

Suit filed by Bank was decreed by Banking Court observing that two defendants having not inherited anything from the deceased ex-Managing Director of the Company, they had no personal liability especially when they were neither guarantors nor had they signed any document

Grievance of Bank was against that part of judgment and decree which had restricted liability of said two defendants to the property inherited by them from deceased ex-Managing Director

Judgment and decree impugned in appeal were 'based on consent of counsel for the Bank

Concession in question purely related to a question of fact

As far as liability of the two defendants to satisfy decree was concerned, it was a consent decree, which was not appealable.

Judgment & Decree

SYED JAMSHED ALI, J.

The suit filed by the appellant-Bank against the respondents was decreed on 8-12-1998 on the basis of the admission of the learned counsel for the defendants. Perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the learned Banking Judge observed that defendants/ respondents 7 and 8 had not inherited anything from the ex-Managing Director namely Muhammad Saeed Akhtar deceased and as such they have no personal liability especially when they are not guarantors nor have they signed any document. Confronted with the above situation, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-Bank stated that he claimed the decree against the said defendants /respondents as legal heirs of the deceased and the decree shall be executed out of the assets which respondents 7 and 8 have inherited from the deceased i.e., Muhammad Saeed Akhtar.

2. The grievance of the learned counsel for the appellant is against that part of the judgment and decree which restricts the liability of respondents 7 and 8 to the property inherited by them from Muhammad Saeed Akhtar. The learned counsel submits that the said respondents had furnished personal guarantees and they were, therefore, personally liable to satisfy the decree not only against the assets inherited by them but that their personal assets could also be proceeded against for satisfaction of the decree. He seeks modification of the decree.

3. Nobody is in attendance on behalf of the respondents. Except respondents 7 and 8, the others are pro forma respondents. Respondents 7 and 8 were directed to be served through a notice in the daily Jang. The notice was duly published which has appeared in the daily Jang of 7-7-2004 for today's date of hearing. They are not in attendance and, therefore, proceeded against ex parte.

4. The judgment and decree impugned in this appeal are based on the consent of' the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff-Bank. The concession purely relates to a question of fact. Therefore, we are of the view that as far as liability of respondents 7 and 8 to satisfy the decree is concerned, it is a consent decree and, therefore, not appealable. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. H.B.T./H-46/L Appeal dismissed.