1985 PLP 1107 (SCMR)
Malik GHULAM RASOOL‑‑Petitioner Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1985 PLP 1107 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | Aslam Riaz Hussain and Shafiur Rahman, JJ |
| Parties | Malik GHULAM RASOOL‑‑Petitioner Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others‑‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | Constitution of Pakistan (1973) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1985 PLP 1107 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1973) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1985 PLP 1107 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Aslam Riaz Hussain and Shafiur Rahman, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1985 PLP 1107 (SCMR) (Malik GHULAM RASOOL‑‑Petitioner Versus GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ch. Khalil‑ur‑Rahman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Rana Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
- Hamid Aslam Qureshi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent. Date of hearing: 18th February, 1985.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment and order of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated 18‑12‑1984 in Appeal No.445/1005 of 1984). ‑‑‑Art. 212(3)‑‑Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974), S.11‑ Reversion‑‑Ad hoc appointment/promotion‑‑Promotion/appointment of petitioner being on ad hoc basis in excess of quota reserved for promotees and against a post meant for initial recruitment, on arrival of rightful person, he would stand reverted in normal course‑‑No question of law of general public importance being involved, leave to appeal refused.‑‑
Judgment & Decree
SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.‑‑ The petitioner seeks leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal dated the 18th December, 1984 dismissing the service appeal of the petitioner challenging the orders of the Governor of Punjab dated 21‑5‑1984 and 4‑6‑1984. The petitioner earlier held the post of Stenographer. He was thereafter promoted as Assistant Labour Officer and finally, as Labour Officer. By the impugned orders, it was adjudged that the petitioner's appointment as Labour Officer was against the vacancy reserved for initial recruitment and so was his promotion to the post of Assistant Labour Officer. On the availability of direct recruits, promotions made in excess of the quota reserved for lower cadre was brought to an end and the incumbents were brought back to their substantive posts. In. the case of the petitioner that post happened to be that of the Stenographer. The petitioner challenged such a treatment but the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the facts forming the basis of the impugned orders were correct and the action taken was in accordance with the law. For that reason, the service appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioner had attempted to demonstrate before us that the petitioner had in fact been promoted as Assistant Labour Officer and as Labour Officer against the post reserved for promotion and for that reason was not liable to be dislodged there from. In any case, it was contended that his appointment as Assistant Labour Officer even if in contravention of the rules, stood the test of scrutiny under Martial Law instructions and stood sanctified and regularised. He could not after such scrutiny be treated as not regularly appointed to the past. The order which issued as a result of Martial Law instructions scrutiny on 1‑9‑1977 shows that what was scrutinised and approved was the "ad hoc appointments/promotions" on the post of Assistant Labour Officers and it was regularised in that capacity and no other. The petitioner's name appears at serial No.6 against the designation 'Assistant Labour Officer'. An ad hoc appointment even after such regularisation does not get any better characteristic than that of ad hoc appointment. Consequently, the petitioner cannot on the basis of Marital Law instructions claim a better right than otherwise possessed. As regards his appointment to the post of Labour Officer the orders passed from time to time show that the appointment of the petitioner as Labour Officer was on post meant for initial recruitment and on the arrival of direct recruit he would stand reverted. This appears clearly from para. 2 of the letter, dated 16‑1‑1980 and letter dated 14‑7‑1982. The calculations made by the learned counsel for the petitioner show that only 1.2 posts were available for promotion as Assistant Labour Officer at the time when one Saif as No.1 and the petitioner as No.2 were recommended for appointment and in fact were appointed subsequently. This itself shows that the appointment of the petitioner was in excess of the quota reserved for the promotees and that could happen in the normal course. It had nevertheless the attendant liability of the reversion of the petitioner as and when the rightful person was available for filling up the reserved post. According to the recitals in the various orders issuing from the competent authority, it appears that promotions on the posts of Labour Officer as well as Assistant Labour Officer was in excess of the quota reserved for the promotees. In such a situation, we find that no such question of law of general public importance arises in the case any require further examination and leave to appeal is refused. M.I. Leave refused