1984 PLP 1129 (PLC(CS))

Date of hearing : 23rd January, 1982. This appeal arises from the decision, dated 15th July, 1981 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 9, Multan, where by the grievance petition of the respondent union was accepted and the order of the appellant, whereby working hours were increased from 7 to 8 hours daily, excepting Thursday was set aside.

2. On two points the learned lower Court accepted the grievance petition and set aside the order of enhancement of working hours‑one is that without getting permission under section 47 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the timings were changed which amounted to changing the conditions of service when the industrial dispute was pending and the other is that the order of enhancement of, working hours was hit by section 9 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The order enhancing the working hours from seven to eight hours was passed on 30th October, 1979, but according to certificate Exh. P. 75, industrial dispute was raised on 26th March, 1980. It is, therefore, apparent that about five months after the passing of the order of the enhancement of the working hours, the industrial dispute was raised and that no industrial dispute was pending at the time the order attacked by the respondent was passed. The require ment of law is that during the pendency of an industrial dispute, no change should be brought about in the service conditions. An industrial dispute can be said to be pending obviously after it has been legally raised. Since at the time the order was passed, no industrial dispute was pending and it was raised about. five months after that taking of permission under sec tion 47 was not necessary. For ready reference the certificate Exh. P. 75 is reproduced, which reads as under:‑

"Certified that the industrial dispute, dated 26th March, 1980 raised by the R. T. C. Labour Welfare Union (C. B. A.) is still pending. The next date for joint conciliation meeting is fixed for 16th August, 1980." The words "industrial dispute, dated 26th March, 1980" clearly show that the dispute was raised on 26th March, 1980 and before that it did not exist. No other evidence has been pointed out to show either that the date in the certificate is wrongly given or that actually the dispute had been raised before the order of enhancement of working hours was passed.

3. The other ground given by the lower Court is also not correct. Section 9 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 does not say that the working hours cannot be changed. It says only this much that no provi sion of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 shall effect any law, custom, usage, award or settlement enforced immediately before the promulgation of the Ordinance in so far as such law, custom, usage award or settlement ensures that condition of employment more favourable to the workman than those provided in the Standing Orders Ordinance. Nothing in the said Ordinance allows the enhancement of the working hours, nor under any provision of this Ordinance the order enhancing the working hours was passed.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent has raised a question which was not raised before the lower Court. He says that the order of enhance ment of working hours is hit by section 23‑B (6) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 also. Subsection (6) reads as under:‑- "The management shall not take any decision in the following matters without the advice in writing of the workers representative namely :‑ (i) (ii) changing physical working conditions in the factory ; (iii) .. (iv) . . . (v) regulations of daily working hours and practice." Firstly, enhancement of working hours cannot be said to be changing physical working conditions in the factory, or regulating daily working hours and practice, working conditions did not mean enhancement of working hours, nor regulations of daily working hours mean so. Secondly, there is no evidence to the effect that the appellant had not taken the advice in writing of the workers representative. This is a question of fact. If such a plea had been taken in the grievance petition, of course the appellant would have produced to this effect. Moreover, there is no evidence' that at all the respondent Union had any workers' representatives, So, now it is too late to raise such a plea of fact at the stage of the final argu ments of the appeal.

5. As a result of the observations made above, I accepting the appeal and setting aside the impugned decision of the lower Court dismiss the grievance petition of the respondent Union. Mr. Said Ahmed Court Clerk of the appellant Mr. Ghulam Farid worker of the respondent Union. A.E Appeal accepted.