CLD 2002

2002 PLP 1692 (CLD)

Mst. ALAM BIBI‑‑‑Appellant Versus PALTINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED‑‑‑Respondent

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore
Decided Date
Regular First Appeal No.219 of 2002, heard on 19th June, 2002.
Honorable Judges
Jawwad S. Khawaja and Abdul Shakoor Paracha, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2002 PLP 1692 (CLD)
Forum / Court Lahore
Bench Members Jawwad S. Khawaja and Abdul Shakoor Paracha, JJ
Parties Mst. ALAM BIBI‑‑‑Appellant Versus PALTINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED‑‑‑Respondent
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2002 PLP 1692 (CLD)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2002 PLP 1692 (CLD)?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Jawwad S. Khawaja and Abdul Shakoor Paracha, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2002 PLP 1692 (CLD) (Mst. ALAM BIBI‑‑‑Appellant Versus PALTINUM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED‑‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Ch. Imdad Ali Khan for Appellant.
  • Noor Muhammad Khan Chandio for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 19th June, 2002.

Headnotes / Summary

Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss. 17 & 22‑‑‑Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.58(b)(f)‑‑‑Decree for recovery of loan amount‑‑‑Plea of Bank was that appellant‑defendant had created mortgage in favour of Bank to secure the liabilities of other defendant and delivered original title deed of her house to Bank and executed in favour of Bank registered mortgage deed, general power of attorney and memorandum of deposit of title deed‑‑‑Suit was decreed against all defendants‑‑ Appellant denied to have executed such documents or delivered title deeds to Bank; her earlier explanation about custody of title deeds with Bank was that another defendant (a friend of appellant's son) had obtained her original title deeds; her explanation in this regard before High Court was that same were handed over to said defendant in order to show to some Government department that he was a person of means‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Appellant had handed over title documents to Bank in 1998, but thereafter had done nothing to retrieve the same‑‑‑Bank filed shit oil 18‑5‑2000‑‑‑Appellant lodged F.I.R. on 7‑7‑2002 alleging that title deeds given to said defendant had been misplaced‑‑ ‑Story set up by appellant was far‑fetched and not credible‑‑‑Timing of such F.I.R. showed that same had been meant to thwart recovery suit filed by Bank‑‑ Explanation given for handing over title deeds to said defendant was not plausible as how he could have established that he was man of means by showing title deed of a house owned by appellant, who was not related to him‑‑‑No justification 'existed for letting title deeds remain with said defendant for a period of two years ' till lodging of F.I.R. on 7‑7‑2002‑‑‑Case set up by appellant was not plausible having been advanced just to frustrate recovery of Bank dues‑‑‑Impugned decree was not open to exception‑‑‑High Court dismissed the appeal in circumstances.

Judgment & Decree

JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.‑ This appeal impugns the judgment and decree dated 5‑3‑2002 passed by the learned Banking Court No. II, Lahore. The said decree was passed in a suit filed by the respondent‑Bank seeking recovery of an amount of Rs.7,685,152, together with other amounts as prayed for in the plaint. The suit was filed against the appellant and 12 other defendants. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant Mst. Alam Bibi (defendant No.13) alone. The case of the respondent‑Bank against the appellant was that she had created a mortgage in favour of the Bank to secure the liabilities of Construction Management Associates (respondent No.2). The original title deed of the property in question was delivered to the respondent‑Bank. Furthermore, the appellant also executed a registered mortgage deed and general power of attorney both dated 4‑4‑1998 and a memorandum of deposit of title deeds dated 3‑4‑1998.

2. Before us learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant had not, in fact, executed the mortgage deed, power of attorney or memorandum of deposit of title deeds. It was also denied that the original title deeds had been delivered to the respondent‑Bank. The fact that the title deeds together with original record of the C.D.A. relating to the property in question were with the respondent‑Bank, was explained by stating that Azizullah Khan respondent No‑13, who is a friend of the appellant's son, had obtained the appellant's original title deeds. Today learned counsel for the appellant stated that the title documents were handed over to Azizullah Khan in order to enable him to show to some Government Department that he was a person of means. The title documents it may be noted, were handed over by the appellant and were deposited with the respondent‑Bank in 1998. Thereafter, nothing whatsoever was done by the appellant to retrieve the title documents. However, it was only after the Bank filed its suit on 18‑5‑2000 that a few weeks later an F.I.R. being F.I.R. No. 18 of 2000 dated 7‑7‑2002, was lodged. It was stated therein that the title documents had been given to the aforesaid Azizullah Khan but 'had been misplaced. The story set up by the appellant, to put to mildly, is far‑‑fetched and not credible. The timing of the afore-noted F.I.R. also shows that it was meant to thwart the recovery suit filed by the respondent‑Bank. Even the explanation given for handing over the title, documents to Azizullah Khan, is not plausible. We do not see how Azizullah Khan could have established that he was a man of means by showing .title documents of a house owned by the appellant. Admittedly, the appellant is not, in any manner, related to Azizullah Khan. Furthermore, even if title documents had been delivered to Azizullah Khan for such spurious purpose, there was no justification for letting the same remain with Azizullah Khan for a period of almost two years until the above‑noted F.I.R. was registered on 7‑7‑2000.

3. In view of the above circumstances, we find that the case set up by the appellant, is not plausible and has merely been advanced with the object of frustrating the recovery of the respondent‑Bank's outstanding. We, therefore, find that the impugned decree" is not open to exception. This appeal, as a consequence, is dismissed. S.A.K./A‑555/L Appeal dismissed.