PLC 1970

1970 PLP 284 (PLC)

MESSRS MASTER RUBBER & TYRE. Co. LTD., KARACHI Versus MASTER RUBBER & TYRE WORKERS' UNION

Jurisdiction / Court
Industrial Appellate Tribunal West Pakistan
Decided Date
Appeal No. KAR.‑252 of 1969, decided on 24th December 1969.
Honorable Judges
Inamullah Khan, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1970 PLP 284 (PLC)
Forum / Court Industrial Appellate Tribunal West Pakistan
Bench Members Inamullah Khan, Appellate Tribunal
Parties MESSRS MASTER RUBBER & TYRE. Co. LTD., KARACHI Versus MASTER RUBBER & TYRE WORKERS' UNION
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1970 PLP 284 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1970 PLP 284 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Industrial Appellate Tribunal West Pakistan bench comprising: Inamullah Khan, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1970 PLP 284 (PLC) (MESSRS MASTER RUBBER & TYRE. Co. LTD., KARACHI Versus MASTER RUBBER & TYRE WORKERS' UNION). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • S. M. A. Sami and Izzat Puri for Appellants.
  • 3. The first question is as to whether an appeal is maintainable against the impugned order. On the face of it, and it is also conceded by the learned Advocate for the appellant, that if the order be under section 45 of the Ordinance, it is not appealable. It is, however, contended by Mr. Izzat purl that the order purports to, be under section 34 of the Ordinance and, therefore, appealable. It is submitted that the order amounts to an interim award and is, therefore, appealable.

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Industrial dispute ‑‑Award‑Main ingredient ‑Determina tion of any industrial disputeDetermination or adjudication 4ssible only if parties allowed to lead evidence if they so Resist‑Parties not allowed to lead evidence‑No determination of dispute envisaged by word "award"‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S. 2(ii). (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss. 34 &45(1) read with Ss. 37(3) & 38‑Or.ler of Labour Court prohibit or lock‑out under S. 45(I) on application under S.34 Not an interim award so as to be appealable before Appellate Tribunal. Ditto of hearing: 24th December 1969.

Judgment & Decree

Ss. 34 &45(1) read with Ss. 37(3) & 38‑Or.ler of Labour Court prohibit or lock‑out under S. 45(I) on application under S.34 Not an interim award so as to be appealable before Appellate Tribunal. S. M. A. Sami and Izzat Puri for Appellants. Ditto of hearing: 24th December 1969. This is an appeal against an order of the learned Chairman of the First West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi. Toe impugned order was passed on 23rd December 1969, on au application under section 34 read with section 46 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). I may at once make it clear that section 46, is wrongly mentioned. The appellants before me must have meant to be under section 4 of the Ordinance. Under section 45 of the Ordinance the Labour Court and the Tribunal has power to prohibit strike or lock‑out, as the case may be. The facts, giving rise to the appeal, briefly put are these.

2. The General Secretary, Master Rubber & Tyre Workers' Union made an application on 15th December 1969, with a prayer that the Court "be pleased to adjudicate and declare the lock‑out of 161 workers as illegal and the opponent be directed to discontinue the lock-out forthwith allowing all the locked‑out workers and/or workers on strike to resume their duties forthwith with full benefits and any loss of service." The. Court was pleased to issue notice of the application for 3rd December 1969. The learned Chairman, after hearing Mr. Obaidurrehman and Mr. A. H. Puri for the respondents (now appellants), passed. The impugned order directing that, "the lock‑out/strike should both be discontinued forthwith".

3. The first question is as to whether an appeal is maintainable against the impugned order. On the face of it, and it is also conceded by the learned Advocate for the appellant, that if the order be under section 45 of the Ordinance, it is not appealable. It is, however, contended by Mr. Izzat purl that the order purports to, be under section 34 of the Ordinance and, therefore, appealable. It is submitted that the order amounts to an interim award and is, therefore, appealable.

4. Award is defined under section _2(ii) of the Ordinance. It means the determination by a Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating there to and includes an‑ interim award. The question as to whether the order purports to be an award or interim award. One of the main ingredients of an award is that it must be a determination of any industrial dispute. A matter can be said to have been determined or adjudicated upon only if the parties had been allowed to lead evidence, if they so desired. In this case, Mr. Puri submits that on 23rd December 1969, his client was only called upon to watch the conduct of the case and not to lead any evidence. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was any determination of the dispute between the parties. The Court in fact has fixed the matter to be called again on 15th January 1970, obviously to allow the parties to lead evidence, if they so desired, in support of their respective contentions. The Court would decide the matter either on 15th January 1970, or postpone it for further evidence to some other date and dispose of the application in a judicial way contemplated by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

5. On merit it was submitted by Mr. Puri that the Management did not lock‑out 161 persons. It had dispensed with their services, as they were temporary employees. This is a question which I cannot consider at this stage. It would be for the Court to determine the question after hearing the parties.

6. I am, for the reasons given above, of the view that no appeal lies. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.