1988 PLP 992 (PLC(CS))
MUHAMMAD SADIO Versus Messrs ALA PLASTIC COMPANY
| Citation | 1988 PLP 992 (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind |
| Bench Members | Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD SADIO Versus Messrs ALA PLASTIC COMPANY |
| Primary Law | Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1988 PLP 992 (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1988 PLP 992 (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1988 PLP 992 (PLC(CS)) (MUHAMMAD SADIO Versus Messrs ALA PLASTIC COMPANY). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Nemo for Appellant.
- Nemo for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 8th February, 1988.
Headnotes / Summary
Ss. 25-A & 38(3)--West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. 1(4)(b) & S.O. 12(3)--Termination of service--Employer not proved to have 20 or more workers--Provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance. 1968 not applicable--Petition, in circumstances, held, was rightly dismissed as not maintainable.
Judgment & Decree
Date of hearing: 8th February, 1988. This is an appeal filed by the appellant against an impugned order, dated 4-5-1984, passed by the Sind Labour Court No. II at Karachi, who had dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969.
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case were that the appellant claimed to be a permanent workman in the respondent establishment since 11-7-1982 and on 22-9-1982 he claimed to have met with an accident and could not attend the duties for 2 days and then attended his duties but remained under treatment as an outdoor patient till 17-11-1982. Further, the claim of the appellant was that on 5-1-1983 all of a sudden he was gate stopped by the Cheokidar saying that his services had been dispensed with, therefore, being aggrieved, he filed his grievance petition under section 25-A, I.R.O. 1969.
3. The respondent establishment resisted the petition raising legal objection on the maintainability of the petition on the ground that neither the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 nor the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, were applicable on the employments of the establishment and that the appellant was purely a temporary employee and as he had met with an accident mainly due to his negligence and was admitted in Hospital for which period he was fully paid his wages, therefore, it was incorrect to say that he resumed his duties after two days and worked upto 5-1-1985 when in fact, he had left his employment on his own. Thus, the respondent claimed that the appellant was not entitled to maintain his grievance petition, which was liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits-in-evidence and they were duly cross-examined. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order hence, the present appeal.
5. Today, when the case was called, nemo was present on behalf of both the parties. However, I have carefully perused the memo of the present appeal as well as the record and proceedings of the case. At the very outset, I would observe here that admittedly the appellant had miserably failed to prove the factum of employment of 20 or more workers at the relevant time in the respondent establishment particularly in view of the facts that the appellant had himself claimed that the provisions of I.R.O. 1969 and the Standing Orders Ordinance were well-applicable to his employment as burden of proof could not a be discharged by him. Furthermore, the witness produced by the appellant in support of his contentions was merely a hear say and cannot be relied upon. In view of the admitted position and the legal aspects of the present case, I find nothing wrong in the impugned order and so, I would maintain the same.
6. For the reasons discussed by me above I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and would maintain the same. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. A.E./1301/Lb. S. Appeal dismissed.