1988 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

MUNAWAR ALI KHAN (CHAIRMAN).‑‑The appellant was working as Sindhi Language Teacher in Shagufta Government Boys Primary School, Orangi Town, Karachi, when his services were dispensed with, in pursuance of the order of Director School Education, Karachi, dated 4‑2‑1986, which was conveyed to him by Sub‑Divisional Education Officer, Orangi, Karachi vide his Office order, dated 5‑2‑1986. The appellant preferred departmental appeal against the order of termination of his services to the secretary to government of Sind, Education Department but the same was rejected by order dated 19th July, 1987. In the present appeal, the appellant has prayed for setting aside the' aforesaid orders. The background of the case as disclosed in the judgment of Sand High Court (Criminal Appeal No.39/85), dated 12‑8‑1985 is that the appellant alongwith two others namely Isso and Shahan was challaned in the Court on a criminal charge of causing the death of Soomar and inflicting simple injury to Urs. Initially the challan submitted in the Court was sections 307, 325, 323, 5(14 and 34, P.P.C. but subsequently on account of the deceased Soomar having succumbed to the injuries, section 302, P.P.C. was also added in tl,c challan. The unfortunate incident arose over the dispute of children which led to the tight between the parties in which the deceased Soomar was given blows by the co accused Isso and Shahan and the appellant caused simple injury to Urs. Although the trial Court convicted the co‑accused Isso and Shahan under section 302/34, P.P.C., the appellant was not held even constructively liable for the said offence. He was found guilty only for causing simple injury to Urs on his foot punishable under section 323, P.P.C. In appeal to the High Court the conviction of co accused Isso and Shahan was altered from under section 302/34 to miller section 325/34, P.P.C. and they were sentenced to suffer R.I. for 5 years and fine of Rs.1,000 each or in default of payment of fine to undergo R.I. for one year more whereas the conviction of the appellant under section 323, P.P.C. was maintained but the sentence of imprisonment awarded to him was reduced to the one he had already undergone. In course of the criminal trial against the appellant he was placed under suspension vide order dated 7‑6‑1984. ;'~ ~ .E4: the decision of the High Court was conveyed to the School authorities, the appellant was removed from service. The learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned Government counsel were heard in support of their respective view points. We also went through the relevant record. After considering the arguments and the relevant material on record appeal was allowed with no order as to costs and the impugned order was set aside, by short order dated 20‑6‑1988 for reasons to be recorded later on. Following are the reasons in support of the said short order. It was admitted on both hands that the appellant was not given any show cause notice as required by rule 5(3) of the Sind Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the said rules) nor any enquiry envisaged by rule 6 of the said rules was held against him. In fact the appellant was not punished for any of the charges listed in rule 3 of the said rules. Had any such charge been levelled against him the procedure contained in rules 5 and 6 referred to above would have been followed. The only reason for his removal from service was his conviction in the criminal case. This is clear from the off‑ice order of Sub‑Divisional Education Officer dated 5‑2‑1986. It reads as under:‑ "In pursuance of the Directorate of School Education, Karachi Letter No. DSW/Admn‑E7‑Misc.3/(390‑92)/8‑6, dated 4‑2‑1986, the services of Mr. Oadir Bux S.L.T. of Shagufta Government Boys Primary School Orangi Town, Karachi is hereby removed w.e.f. the date of declaration of the decision of the honourable High Court of Sind as he has been declared guilty by the Honourable High Court of Sind in the decision:" Since the appellant's removal from service was entirely based on the decision of the High Court, the impugned order was obviously passed under rule 8(a) of the said rules, which reads as under: "

8. Nothing in rule 5 shall apply to a case ‑‑‑‑‑ 8. (a) Where the accused has been convicted by a Court and sentenced to imprisonment or fine on charges) involving moral turpitude, in which case the competent authority shall on receipt of intimation of the conviction, make an order dismissing or removing from service or reducing him in rank as it deems fit; provided that in case of conviction on charge (s) of corruption the accused shall be dismissed from service. It would appear that the above rule would come into play when the accused was convicted on the charge involving moral turpitude. Therefore, the question would arise if the charge of causing simple hurt for which the appellant was convicted under section 323, P.P.C., involved moral turpitude. The expression "moral turpitude" has not been defined in the said rules. However, when we think of that expression, we feel that it refers to something connected with character of the accused. It is a sort of reflection on his character. It would help us to understand the connotation of these words if we look for their dictionary meaning. In `The Lexicon Webster Dictionary' at page 621, the word "moral" means something of or concerned with principles of right and wrong in conduct and character. The word `turpitude' as defined at page 1066 in the same Dictionary is inherent baseness or vileness of principle, words or action; shameful wickedness; moral depravity. Keeping the above elaboration of the expression "moral turpitude" in C view, we are certainly not impressed by the argument that the appellant's act of causing simple injury on foot of his adversary was a charge involving `moral turpitude'. As is clear from the judgment of the High Court, the appellant's act was not only sudden but was also not premeditated. It was committed at the spur of moment. Such an act cannot be construed to be even remotely connected with the appellant's character or, reflection on his character. Accordingly the appellant's removal from service following his conviction on the charge of causing simple hurt to his adversary in the sudden fight cannot be legally sustained. He has already been punished by the Criminal Court for the alleged injury caused by him to his adversary. Since his conviction for that offence was not accompanied by the sting "moral turpitude" it cannot be made the basis for‑his removal from service. For above reasons the appeal was allowed with no order as to costs and the impugned order of appellant's removal from service was set aside by short order mentioned above. AA./171/Sr.S Appeal allowed.