1988 PLP 89 (MLD)
BASHIR AHMAD and another — Appellants Versus FATEH SHAH and another Respondents
| Citation | 1988 PLP 89 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | Akhtar Hassan, J |
| Parties | BASHIR AHMAD and another — Appellants Versus FATEH SHAH and another Respondents |
| Primary Law | Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913). |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1988 PLP 89 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913). as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1988 PLP 89 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Akhtar Hassan, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1988 PLP 89 (MLD) (BASHIR AHMAD and another — Appellants Versus FATEH SHAH and another Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ch.Khurshid Ahmad for Appellants.
- C.M.Sarwar for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 30th May, 1988,
Headnotes / Summary
Ss. 4 & 15--Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.100
Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.3-pre-emption suit--Limitation--Question of fact--Suit was contested only on point of limitation--Appellants-vendees contended that counting limitation from date since when they were in possession of suit land to date of suit, suit was barred by time--Courts below coming to conclusion that possession, if at all, was already continuing for a long period and that it could, not be related to sale itself--Entries in revenue record showing that vendees possession was found to have been based upon previous appearing for a long period in record and therefore, it was not a new event on their part to enter upon land under sale so as to serve as notice to prospective pre-emption
Plea of appellants not established before Courts below and this finding of fact, held, could not be upset in second appeal.
Judgment & Decree
This Regular Second Appeal arises from the judgment/decree dated 2-2-1978 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sargodha, the whereby appellants vendee first appeal was dismissed.
2. It was a suit for pre-emption which is being contested before this Court only on the point of limitation. The sale was initially entered in the register of mutstion on 20-4-1964, was attested on 28-4-1964 while the suit was filed on 26 ants-vendee's contention was that they -had been delivered possession of ' under the sale on 20-4-1964 and counting the limitation from this date the suit Filed on 26-4-1965 was barred by time. The two Courts below repelled this contention holding that the appellants possession, if at all, for a long period and that it could not be related to the sale itself. The entry in Khasra Girdawari Exh.D.1 showing the appellants possession was found have been based upon previous entries appearing for a long period in the record and, therefore it was not a new event on their part to enter upon the land under the, salt, so as to serve as notice to prospective pre-emptors. This proposition has not been much contested, nor even it could Possibly he because the fact remains that such an entry was noticed being recorded for a long time before the sale. It could not help the appellants and the view taken by the Courts below is not open to any exception.
3. An attempt was made through another entry Exh.P.8 to show that the possession was a new event coinciding with the sale but the diagonal indicating the change of possession in the Khasra Girdawari was found to have been mutilated and was suspect. This impression was not dispelled by producing any other evidence. Ch. Khurshid Ahmad for the appellants tried to canvass that the Patwari s statement in that context was not properly read and appreciated. The impugned judgment shows that it had been duly considerer. His explanation that suspect entry speaks for itself and all the more when it appears for the first time coinciding with the dispute sale. The plea of the appellants was not established and since it was a finding of fact, it could not be upset in the second appeal.
4. Counsel for both the parties have been heard on merits, No other point was urged to support the appeal. It is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. M.Y.H/B-63/L Appeal dismissed.