PLC 1989

1989 PLP 321 (PLC)

NOOK KHAN Versus KARACHI PORT TRUST and 3 others

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi High Court
Decided Date
Constitutional Petition No. D‑816 of 1988, decided on 7th November, 1988.
Honorable Judges
Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Abdul Rasool Agha, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1989 PLP 321 (PLC)
Forum / Court Karachi High Court
Bench Members Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Abdul Rasool Agha, JJ
Parties NOOK KHAN Versus KARACHI PORT TRUST and 3 others
Primary Law Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1989 PLP 321 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1989 PLP 321 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi High Court bench comprising: Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Abdul Rasool Agha, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1989 PLP 321 (PLC) (NOOK KHAN Versus KARACHI PORT TRUST and 3 others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑

Representation

  • Ghulam Ghous for Petitioner.
  • Qamar Abbas on pre‑admission notice for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 7th November, 1988.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 38(3)‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199‑‑Grievance petition against dismissal from service‑‑Petitioner's departmental appeal against dismissal having failed, petitioner instead of approaching Labour Court for his grievance, filed second appeal before Federal Minister which was still pending‑‑Petitioner's grievance petition thereafter, failed as time‑barred as also his appeal‑‑Labour appellate Tribunal's order assailed as arbitrary on the ground that in a similar case of a co‑worker where the grievance application was also time‑barred, Labour Court had ordered reinstatement of worker and appeal against that order had peen dismissed by Labour Appellate Tribunal‑‑Co‑worker's case referred by petitioner, was on a different footing as in that case rights of parties were adjudicated upon by civil Court and decree had been passed m favour of dismissed employee‑‑Grievance petition in the present case had been dismissed by Labour Court and that order had been upheld by Labour Appellate Tribunalsuch order passed by Labour Court and upheld by Appellate Tribunal was neither in excess of jurisdiction nor suffered from lack of jurisdiction‑ Constitutional petition against such order of Labour Appellate Tribunal being devoid of merit was dismissed in circumstances.

Judgment & Decree

SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.‑‑Granted subject to all just exceptions.

2. The petitioner has challenged the order of Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 26‑4‑1988 passed in Appeal No. KAR‑40 of 1986 filed by the petitioner against the order of Sindh Labour Court No. 1, Karachi. The facts of the case are as follows:‑ The petitioner was serving as a Watchman with respondent No.1. He was dismissed from service on 27‑I1‑1983 after holding a departmental enquiry. The petitioner preferred an appeal against his dismissal from service before the Chairman of respondent No.1, which was rejected on 9‑2‑1984. Thereafter, petitioner instead of approaching the Labour Court under section 25‑A of the I.R.O. filed a second appeal before the Federal Minister which; it is said, is still pending. Notwithstanding the pendency of that appeal before the Federal Minister, the petitioner filed a grievance petition under section 25‑A of I.R.O. before the Labour Court on 22‑12‑1984. The grievance petition of the petitioner was dismissed as time‑barred against which he preferred‑ an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal which was also dismissed on the ground that the grievance petition filed by the petitioner was not within time. Mr. Ghulam Ghous, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the order of the learned Tribunal below was arbitrary as in a similar case where the grievance petition was time‑barred the Labour Court allowed reinstatement of worker and the appeal preferred against such order has been dismissed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The facts of the case which are relied upon by the learned counsel are stated in the petition and it is alleged that another worker Syed Sharif Hussain Shah who was also dismissed had filed a civil suit seeking declaration against the order of dismissal before the civil Court which was decreed. The said Syed Sharaf Hussain Shah armed with the decree of the civil Court filed a grievance petition under section 25‑A of the I.R.O. and on the basis of the decree of the civil Court the Labour Court, ordered his reinstatement in the service. It was against that order, it is alleged that the respondent No. 1 filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal which was dismissed. It is, therefore, quite clear that the case of Syed Sharif Hussain Shah was on a different footing as in that case rights of the parties were adjudicated upon by the civil Court and the decree was passed in favour of dismissed employee. In the present case the grievance petition has been dismissed by the Labour Court and this order has been upheld by the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that the grievance petition preferred by the petitioner before the Labour Court was beyond time. The order passed by the Labour Court as well as by the Labour Appellate Tribunal holding that the grievance petition was not within time is neither in excess of jurisdiction nor suffers from any lack of jurisdiction. There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel or the petitioner that the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal have acted in a discriminatory manner in allowing reinstatement of another worker in‑ the same transaction. We have already pointed out that the case of the other worker relied upon by the petitioner was on different footing, as in that case the rights of the parties were already adjudicated upon and determined in proceedings before a competent Court of law. There is no merit in this petition which is dismissed in limine. AA./N‑143/K Petition dismissed.