1989 PLC 506 (PLP)

NAZIR AHMAD BHATTI, J.‑‑The facts of this writ petition are very simple. Saadat Khan, petitioner herein was employed as a cook on 13‑10‑1984 on daily wages by the Pearl Continental Hotel, respondent No. 3 herein. His services were dispensed with on 20‑7‑1985 as no longer required. The petitioner challenged the order of termination of his service before the Labour Court by an application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court after recording evidence of the parties, by order dated 15‑12‑1985, accepted the application and ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner with full back benefits and wages. Feeling aggrieved by this order the respondent No. 3 filed an appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal which accepted the appeal by order dated I3‑1‑1986 and set aside the order of the Lab6ur Court. Still feeling aggrieved the petitioner riled the writ petition in hand.

2. We have heard carried counsel for the parties who have also led us through the record of the case.

3. The main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner against the impugned order of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal was that tile petitioner had put in more than nine months of service when his services were dispense with and according to classification gi6en in Standing Order No. 1 of the Schedule to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Order. Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) the petitioner has become a permanent workman because he was engaged on work of a permanent nature likely to last more than nine months and had satisfactorily completed the probationary period of three months in the same occupation. It was contended that the employment of cooks by the respondent No. 3 was a work of permanent nature and when the services of the petitioner were terminated he had already put in more than nine months of service which shows that he had satisfactorily completed the probationary period of three months and that under the provisions of Standing Order 12 of the Ordinance his services could not be terminated in the manner in which the same had been done by the respondent No.

3. He has drawn our attention to clause (3) of Standing Order 12 according to which the services of a workman cannot be terminated except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken and it was contended by him that in the order of termination of service of the petitioner no reason was specified.

4. The minute perusal of the order of termination of service of the petitioner will show that his services were no longer required. We have considered this aspect of the matter very anxiously and we are of the opinion that the factum that the services of the petitioner were no longer required was also a reason for termination of his service. In arriving at this conclusion we draw benefit from the provisions contained in clause (1) of Standing Order 12 of the Ordinance which clearly lays down that for terminating employment of a permanent workman for any reason other than misconduct one month's notice shall be given either by the employer or the workman or one month's wages calculated on the basis of average wages earned by the workman during the last three months shall be paid in lieu of notice. It shall thus be seen that the services of a permanent workman can be terminated if no longer required but then he has to be given a one month's notice or his wages as aforesaid in lieu of the notice. 5.???????? From the impugned judgment of the learned Appellate Tribunal we find that he was of the opinion that the petitioner was not a permanent workman and that he being employed on daily wages his services could be terminated at any time when no longer required. We have also anxiously considered this aspect of the matter very thoroughly and we do not find ourselves in agreement with the learned Appellate Tribunal for the simple reason that according to the definition of a permanent workman given in clause (b) of Standing Order 1 of the Ordinance the petitioner had acquired the status of a permanent workman. However, this aspect does not call for any interference in the impugned order of the learned Appellate Tribunal for the reason that he had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter and the mere fact that he arrived at a wrong conclusion would not attract our Constitutional jurisdiction. There is a wealth of case law on the point that a forum having exclusive jurisdiction can decide a matter rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that the exclusive forum has arrived at a wrong conclusion would not give rise to the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.

6. For our own reasons and the reasons given in the foregoing paragraphs we find that there is no error of exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal. However, there is still one more aspect of the case. As a permanent workman the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of a one month's notice for termination of his service under clause (I) of Standing Order 12 of the Ordinance and since that notice was not given to him he is, therefore, entitled to be paid one month's wages calculated on the basis of average wages earned by him during the last three months and the respondent No. 3 is liable to pay the said wages to the petitioner. Finding no other merit in this writ petition we will dismiss it with no orders as to costs. A.A./727/P ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Petition dismissed.