1986 PLP 1265 (CLC)

‑‑‑S. 25‑‑Deposit of decretal amount‑‑Principle of reasonable time‑ Decree‑holder in pre‑emption suit was allowed one month time by trial Court to deposit decretal amount‑‑When period of 13 days was still available to decree‑holder, he obtained stay order in appeal against that order‑‑On dismissal of his appeal, decree‑holder on direction of appellate Court moved formal application on following day before trial Court for permission to deposit decretal amount‑‑Trial Court on same day rejected that application holding that appellate Court alone could grant extension in time as trial Court had become functus officio after passing final order on deposit of decretal amount‑‑Order of appellate Court in revision granted 15 days time to decree‑holder for deposit of decretal amount‑‑No permission of trial Court was necessary as decree holder could make deposit within 13 days as of right‑‑Trial Court instead of informing decree‑holder that no permission was necessary under law, being oblivious of principle of reasonable time, rejected application of decree‑holder in limine‑‑Appellate, Court, held, justly granted time to decree‑holder after correctly applying principle of reasonable time in circumstances. Abdul Majid Khan for Petitioner. Ch. Khan Muhammad Bajwa for Respondents. Date of hearing: 30th September, 1985. This writ petition arises out of a pre‑emption decree which was granted to the respondent on 21‑12‑1982. The respondent was allowed time to deposit the decretal amount till 22‑1‑1983. On 10‑1‑1983 when a period of 13 days was still available to the decree‑holder he obtained a stay order in appeal. On 26‑11‑1984 the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn but the appellant was directed to appear before the trial Court on the following day for permission to deposit the decretal amount. On 27‑11‑1984 the decree‑holder moved an application to the trial Court but it was rejected the same day. It was held that the appellate Court alone could grant extension in time as the trial Court had become funetus officio after passing final orders on 21‑12‑1982. He then moved the appellate Court in revision, which granted him a period of 15 days to deposit the amount. The orders of the learned Additional District Judge dated 16‑1‑1985 are now being assailed in the present writ petition.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that after the dismissal of the appeal the decree‑holder could deposit the decretal amount within 13 days, the time in his credit at the time, the operation of the decree was suspended by the appellate Court on 10‑1‑1983 and that for this purpose he did not require the permission of the trial Court or any other Court. It is also stated that the trial Court had become functus officio after passing final orders on 21‑12‑1982 and, therefore, it had rightly rejected the application on 27‑11‑1984. As regards the orders of the learned Additional District Judge the learned counsel has argued that since the orders passed by the Civil Judge on 27‑11‑1984 did not suffer from any jurisdictional error, the Additional District Judge had no authority to interfere and grant extension in time to the decree‑holder for deposit of the decretal amount.

3. The principle of reasonable time for deposit of the decretal amount in the event of dismissal of an appeal is now well settled. Applying the principle to the present case it is evident that the decree‑holder was entitled to make the deposit within the time available to him, for doing so, at the time, when the operation of the impugned decree was suspended. Strictly speaking no permission was necessary as the petitioner could make the deposit within a period of 13 days as of right. But the fact remains that the application was moved in the trial Court on the direction of the appellate Court, which though competent itself to grant time, referred the decree‑holder to the trial Court. The trial Court was oblivious of the principle of reasonable time. It rejected the application in limine on 27‑11‑1984, instead of informing the decree holder that no permission was necessary under the law. On the other hand it was observed that "it was the discretion of the learned appellate Court only to grant or refuse time." The appellate Court has now granted time after correctly applying the principle of reasonable time declared by the superior Courts. The orders of 16‑1‑1985 are just and proper and do not call for interference in the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. The writ petition is dismissed with no orders as to costs. H . B . T . Petition dismissed.