2007 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J.

Burhanuddin, petitioner herein, seeks the issuance of an appropriate writ directing the respondents to grant him three advance increments on account of improvement in his academic qualification and full allowance during his leave on half pay in terms of Fundamental Rule 81.

2. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that though the qualification of Master Degree in Islamiyat is neither relevant nor entitles the petitioner to advance increments but similar facility has been given to one Abdul Wadood, by this Court in the case of Chairman, A.D.B.P. v. Abdul Wadood in Civil Revision No.555 of 1999, decided on 21-4-2000. The learned counsel in support of his contention also placed reliance on the case of Tara Chand and others v. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board Karachi and others 2005 SCMR 499=2005 PLC (C.S.)

368. The learned counsel next submitted that the petitioner was also entitled to the grant of full allowance during the leave on half average pay as per Fundamental Rule 81.

3. A perusal of the relevant rules regulating the grant of increments reveals that an employee of the Bank would be entitled to advance increments only when he has acquired a higher qualification in the object specified by the bank. Islamiyat is not from amongst the subjects listed in the rules. He, therefore, cannot claim increments as of right and has rightly been declined by the respondents. The judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Chairman, A.D.B.P. v. Abdul Wadood in Civil Revision No.555 of 1999, decided on 21-4-2000 (supra) would not advance the case of the petitioner as the claim of the respondent in that case was decreed on the premises which were not recognized by the rules governing the grant of increments. Therefore, this precedent being per incuriam in nature does not have any binding force. The case of Tara Chand and others v. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board Karachi and others (supra) too would not advance the case of the petitioner as in that case, the Honourable Supreme Court after highlighting the scope of a judgment in rem and a judgment in personam held that a benefit which is due under the law to one should also be extended to another similarly placed regardless altogether of the fact, whether he approached the Court or not in view of the provisions contained in rule 6 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 and rule 33 of Order XLI of the C.P.C. But we do not think, the benefit extended to the respondent in the case of Chairman A.D.B.P. v. Abdul Wadood (supra) could be termed as due under the law by any means so as to justify its grant to the petitioner. Neither the respondent in that case nor any of the persons, alluded to therein who were earlier granted three advance increments, was entitled to such benefit, when none of them acquired the higher qualification in the subject, thus, listed. Granted that equality before law is the supreme ideal for the Courts of law but it does not mean that a benefit, which should not have been extended to any, if extended to one, would furnish a justification for its extension to another. For commission of one wrong or two or any number thereof cannot furnish a justification for yet another. Similarly two wrong precedents would not legalize an act which is void from the very inception.

4. The argument that the petitioner is entitled to the grant of full allowances during the leave on half average pay addressed on the strength of Fundamental Rule 81 appears to be untenable on the face of it, when the rule does not provide any such eventuality. It becomes all the more untenable, when as per para.21.17 of the Personnel Manual, which is more relevant than the rule in this case, an employee of the Bank is not entitled to any allowance during his .Ex Pakistan leave. Above all else, laches of almost ten years would be another factor which would tilt the scales of justice against the grant of the claim asked for. Therefore, we do not think, a case for interference in the exercise of extraordinary equitable discretionary constitutional jurisdiction is made out.

5. For the reasons discussed above, this writ petition being without substance is dismissed in limine. H.B.T./18/P Petition dismissed.