2002 PLP 1632 (CLC)
AMIRUL MULK OF CHARSADDA‑‑‑Petitioner Versus TAUHEED JAN OF CHARSADDA‑‑‑Respondent
| Citation | 2002 PLP 1632 (CLC) |
| Forum / Court | Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P. |
| Bench Members | Mazhar Ali Shah, Senior Member |
| Parties | AMIRUL MULK OF CHARSADDA‑‑‑Petitioner Versus TAUHEED JAN OF CHARSADDA‑‑‑Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2002 PLP 1632 (CLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2002 PLP 1632 (CLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Board of Revenue, N.W.F.P. bench comprising: Mazhar Ali Shah, Senior Member.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2002 PLP 1632 (CLC) (AMIRUL MULK OF CHARSADDA‑‑‑Petitioner Versus TAUHEED JAN OF CHARSADDA‑‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Muhammad Ullah for Petitioner.
- Muhammad Alain for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 117‑‑‑Nishan Dehi or demarcation of land‑‑‑Application for Nishan Dehi or demarcation of land was resisted on ground that there was no provision to the Revenue Law for "Nishan Dehi"‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Provision of S.117 of West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 had authorized Revenue Officer to define limits of any estate or any holding on application of any person‑‑‑Collector had done no wrong if he had ordered for defining limits of property of applicant on his application which he made for ascertaining whether or not any outsider had encroached on his property and there was no wrong with application filed by applicant for Nishan Dehi of his land‑‑‑Word "defining" had been used in S.117 of West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 as to mean "to limit", "to make clear in outline", "to determine" and "to describe"‑‑ Revenue Officer under S.117 of West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 on an application of any interested party thus could conduct survey and define limits of estate or any holding or field no matter if one would call word "define" with any of meaning of the word. (b) Words and phrases‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑"Define"‑‑‑Connotation.
Judgment & Decree
The petitioner has assailed the order, dated 21‑2‑2002 of Presiding Officer, Revenue Appellate Court No.II, Mardan vide which he has dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and has also come in against the order of District Officer (Revenue and Estate) Collector, Charsadda, dated 11‑1‑2002 whereby he accepted the application of the present respondent for "Nishan Dehi" against the petitioner. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that the present respondent made an application to District Officer (Revenue and Estate) Collector, Charsadda for Nishan Dehi demarcation of land located in Mauza Spin Warai and Maira Umerzai which was entertained by District Officer (Revenue and Estate)/Collector, Charsadda. The decision of District Officer (Revenue and Estate)/Collector, Charsadda was appealed against by the present petitioner in the Court of Presiding Officer, Revenue Appellate Court No.II, Mardan who vide his order, dated 21‑2‑2002 held that the application by the respondent for Nishan Dehi was rightly made and that there is nothing illegal about it because section 117 of the Land Revenue Act gives a person a legal right to submit an application for defining limits of any holding. Similarly the same section authorized the Revenue Officer to carry out demarcation of the limits or boundary of any land. Arguments heard. Case file perused. The main thrust of the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no provision of Nishan Dehi in the Revenue law that application of respondent before the District Officer (Revenue and Estate)/Collector. Charsadda was incompetent in the eyes of law. He also stressed the point that there are a number of other persons in the same Khata number and none has been made a party. He maintained that the respondent should have invoked section 135 of Land Revenue Act and not 117 of it. The respondent in his written statement averred that he had submitted an application, dated 19‑9‑2001 actually for the demarcation (which was described .and pointation i.e. Nishan Dehi in the application) to the District Officer (Revenue and Estate)/Collector, Charsadda who, had ordered for its demarcation and that he had submitted application under section 117 of the Land Revenue Act. The perusal of the record of the case would reveal that a heavy weather has been made out by the learned counsel for the petitioner of the impugned application of the present respondent which he says he had made for demarcation of his land. Now a plain reading of section 117 of the Land Revenue Act would reveal that it authorizes a Revenue Officer to define the limits of any estate or any holding on the application of any person. No wrong has been committed by District Officer (Revenue and Estate)/Collector, Charsadda if he has ordered for defining the limits of property of the present respondent on his application which he had made for ascertaining whether or not any outsider has encroached on his property. What is wrong with that application? There is use of word defining in section 117 of the Land Revenue Act. Now common Urdu meaning of word "define" is to limit "to make clear in outline" "to determine" "to describe what a thing exactly. There is a host of rulings of the superior Courts which say that Revenue Officers under section 117 of the Land Revenue Act on an application of any interested party can always conduct survey and define limits of estate or any holding or field. I am afraid making an issue out of the use of word "Nishan Dehi" only amounts to stretching the law too much. One has to look into the spirit of section 117 of Land Revenue Act and that is that every interested .person can invoke this section of Land Revenue Act for setting his share defined no matter if one calls it .with any of the Urdu meaning of the said word. I am of the view that no case has been made out by the learned counsel for the petitioner against the impugned order, dated 21‑2‑2002 of Presiding Officer, Revenue Appellate Court No. II, Mardan. The revision petition, therefore, stands rejected. H.B.T./42/Revenue (N.W.F.P.) Revision petition rejected.