SCMR 1968

1968 PLP 1433 (SCMR)

INAYAT MUHAMMAD KHAN‑Petitioner Versus ABDUL RAHIM AND OTHERS‑Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 89 of 1968, decided on 16th October 1968.
Honorable Judges
Hamoodur Rahman, Muhammad Yaqub Ali and Abdus Sattar, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1968 PLP 1433 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Hamoodur Rahman, Muhammad Yaqub Ali and Abdus Sattar, JJ
Parties INAYAT MUHAMMAD KHAN‑Petitioner Versus ABDUL RAHIM AND OTHERS‑Respondents
Primary Law Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1968 PLP 1433 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1968 PLP 1433 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Hamoodur Rahman, Muhammad Yaqub Ali and Abdus Sattar, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1968 PLP 1433 (SCMR) (INAYAT MUHAMMAD KHAN‑Petitioner Versus ABDUL RAHIM AND OTHERS‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958)

Representation

  • Muhammad Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Masud Akhtar, Attorney for Petitioner.
  • Nemo for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing : 16th October 1968.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, dated the 7th November 1967, in L. P. A. No. 237 of 1961). --,S. 21 (1)‑‑Additional Settlement Commissioner suo motu could review his own order passed earlier in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. JUDGMENT HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.‑The dispute in this case relaxes to property No. P/80 in Ward No. IV of Block F, Chiniot Bazar, Lyallpur. It consists of two shop rooms abutting on the Chiniot Bazar and a residential portion behind them. The residential portion was in possession of the petitioner while the two shop rooms were in the occupation of the first two respondents herein. In 1954 the Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the residential portion and one shop room in the occupation of respondent No. 2 to the petitioner. The other shop room was transferred to respondent No.

1. All three of them, being dissatisfied with this order, filed appeals before the Additional Settlement Commissioner who gave the entire property as a single unit to the petitioner observing that the two shops were of "a nominal size" and their disposal separately would "disfigure the entire property". A few days later, however, the Additional Settlement Com missioner acting suo moto himself reviewed this order and held that as the property was situated in a predominantly commercial area, the two shops should be treated as separate from the residential portion. Another reason which led him to review his previous order was that the petitioner had already been given another shop, bearing No. P. 81 in Ward No. IV which he was not willing to surrender. He could not, therefore, be entitled to two shops under the Settlement Scheme. The petitioner having failed before the Settlement Authorities to get this order set aside, ultimately invoked the writ jurisdic tion of the High Court but failed both before a learned Single Judge and in Letters Patent Appeal. He now seeks special leave to appeal. It is conceded by the learned counsel, appearing in support of the petition, that the shops in dispute existed from pre -Independence, that the area is a predominantly commercial area and that the petitioner has already been given another shop bearing No. P. 81 in Ward IV. In these circumstances, it is clear that he could not, in any event, get more than one shop after these shops had been separated from the residential portion of a building situated in a predominantly commercial area. No injustice has therefore, been done to the petitioner. Learned counsel, however, contends that once the Additional Settlement Commissioner had disposed of the appeal, he had no power to suo moto review his order and even if he did have such a power of review, he could not in the exercise of his review jurisdiction, exercise a power which was given to him only as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, namely, to divide an evacuee property. In the present case what happened was that the Additional Settlement Commissioner suo moto reviewed an order which had been passed by himself on an earlier occasion in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. Subsection (1) of section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act undoubtedly gave him the jurisdiction to do so. There is not substance, therefore, in the first contention. The second contention that in the exercise of his review jurisdiction he could not exercise a delegated power is equally without substance. If he could review he could exercise all the powers that were vested in him. No illegality had been committed by him. Indeed he had done substantial justice in the case. In the circumstances we do not think that this is a fit case for interference by this Court. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Leave refused.

Judgment & Decree

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.‑The dispute in this case relaxes to property No. P/80 in Ward No. IV of Block F, Chiniot Bazar, Lyallpur. It consists of two shop rooms abutting on the Chiniot Bazar and a residential portion behind them. The residential portion was in possession of the petitioner while the two shop rooms were in the occupation of the first two respondents herein. In 1954 the Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred the residential portion and one shop room in the occupation of respondent No. 2 to the petitioner. The other shop room was transferred to respondent No.

1. All three of them, being dissatisfied with this order, filed appeals before the Additional Settlement Commissioner who gave the entire property as a single unit to the petitioner observing that the two shops were of "a nominal size" and their disposal separately would "disfigure the entire property". A few days later, however, the Additional Settlement Com missioner acting suo moto himself reviewed this order and held that as the property was situated in a predominantly commercial area, the two shops should be treated as separate from the residential portion. Another reason which led him to review his previous order was that the petitioner had already been given another shop, bearing No. P. 81 in Ward No. IV which he was not willing to surrender. He could not, therefore, be entitled to two shops under the Settlement Scheme. The petitioner having failed before the Settlement Authorities to get this order set aside, ultimately invoked the writ jurisdic tion of the High Court but failed both before a learned Single Judge and in Letters Patent Appeal. He now seeks special leave to appeal. It is conceded by the learned counsel, appearing in support of the petition, that the shops in dispute existed from pre -Independence, that the area is a predominantly commercial area and that the petitioner has already been given another shop bearing No. P. 81 in Ward IV. In these circumstances, it is clear that he could not, in any event, get more than one shop after these shops had been separated from the residential portion of a building situated in a predominantly commercial area. No injustice has therefore, been done to the petitioner. Learned counsel, however, contends that once the Additional Settlement Commissioner had disposed of the appeal, he had no power to suo moto review his order and even if he did have such a power of review, he could not in the exercise of his review jurisdiction, exercise a power which was given to him only as a delegate of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, namely, to divide an evacuee property. In the present case what happened was that the Additional Settlement Commissioner suo moto reviewed an order which had been passed by himself on an earlier occasion in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction. Subsection (1) of section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act undoubtedly gave him the jurisdiction to do so. There is not substance, therefore, in the first contention. The second contention that in the exercise of his review jurisdiction he could not exercise a delegated power is equally without substance. If he could review he could exercise all the powers that were vested in him. No illegality had been committed by him. Indeed he had done substantial justice in the case. In the circumstances we do not think that this is a fit case for interference by this Court. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Leave refused.