1985 PLP 1605 (SCMR)
Mst. ALLAH WASAI and others — Petitioners Versus YAR MUHAMMAD — Respondent
| Citation | 1985 PLP 1605 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | Aslam Riaz Hussain and Shafiur Rahman, JJ |
| Parties | Mst. ALLAH WASAI and others — Petitioners Versus YAR MUHAMMAD — Respondent |
| Primary Law | Constitution of Pakistan (1973) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1985 PLP 1605 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1973) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1985 PLP 1605 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Aslam Riaz Hussain and Shafiur Rahman, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1985 PLP 1605 (SCMR) (Mst. ALLAH WASAI and others — Petitioners Versus YAR MUHAMMAD — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ch. Muhammad Hasan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Rana Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.
- Naazar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 26th February, 1985.
- Ch. Muhammad Hasan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Rana Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.
Headnotes / Summary
(Against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 15-9-1979 in R.S.A. No. 751 of 1979).
Art. 185(3)--Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.142 & 144--Possession- Nature of--Leave to appeal refused by Supreme Court against concurrent findings of fact by Courts below--Incidence of joint residence of parties due to relationship justified conclusion of First Appellate Court and High Court.
Judgment & Decree
SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.‑‑The petitioners who were unsuccessful as defendants against Yar Muhammad, a member of their family, seek leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 15‑9‑1979 whereby their regular second appeal was dismissed. Yar Muhammad respondent claimed to have purchased from his father an immovable residential property in village Taunsa Shareef. It was by a registered deed, dated 25‑10‑1950. He instituted a civil suit in the year 1967 seeking possession of it on the ground that his step‑mother petitioner No. 1 and his step‑sisters petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 were in permissive possession of the same. The suit was contested by the petitioners on the ground that it was barred by time and that the petitioners have become its owners by adverse possession for over twelve years. These pleas prevailed with the trial Court and the suit was dismissed. On appeal the District Judge held that the possession of the petitioners was permissive throughout and not hostile in derogation of the rights of the plaintiffs. He held the suit to be within time and decreed it for possession of "part of the house" starting from "the common wall of Rooms Nos. 2 and 3 at site plan Exh. D.W.512 and its boundary shall run straight in the south upto Koocha Mahmood Khan." The petitioners went up in appeal against the judgment and decree but the findings were affirmed and their appeal was dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the first appellate Court has gone outside and beyond the pleadings of the plaintiff‑respondent and made out a new case for him. He has reiterated his submissions that the suit was hopelessly time‑barred and the petitioners had acquired an indefeasible right on account of the adverse possession for over twelve years. Not only that a concurrent finding of fact is against the petitioners but we find that in view of the relationship between the parties and their joint residences at the time when the sale in favor of the plaintiff respondents was made and afterwards the conclusions drawn by the first appellate Court and the High Court are sustainable. In specifying the property, the learned District Judge has gone by the boundaries indicated in the registered sale‑deed in favor of the plaintiff respondents. There is no such question of law as may require further examination in this Court. Hence leave to appeal is refused. A.A. Leave refused.