1989 PLP 935 (MLD)
DADA ENTERPRISES, LIMITED‑‑Petitioner Versus THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OCTROI (ADMN) KARACHI METROPOLITAN CORPORATION and others‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1989 PLP 935 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi |
| Bench Members | Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Abdul Rasid Agha, JJ |
| Parties | DADA ENTERPRISES, LIMITED‑‑Petitioner Versus THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OCTROI (ADMN) KARACHI METROPOLITAN CORPORATION and others‑‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Octroi) Rules 1964‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1989 PLP 935 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: West Pakistan Municipal Committees (Octroi) Rules 1964‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1989 PLP 935 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui and Abdul Rasid Agha, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1989 PLP 935 (MLD) (DADA ENTERPRISES, LIMITED‑‑Petitioner Versus THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OCTROI (ADMN) KARACHI METROPOLITAN CORPORATION and others‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Khurshid Anwar for Petitioner.
- S.M. Muslim Naqvi for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 20th September, 1988.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑R.83‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199‑‑Cancellation of licence‑ Challenge to‑‑Constitutional jurisdiction, exercise of‑‑Concurrent orders of Authorities below cancelling temporary retention licence passed without hearing licensee/petitioner were declared as illegal and consequently quashed by High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction.
Judgment & Decree
SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.‑‑The petitioner, whose temporary retention licence issued by the Respondents under Rule 83 (f) of the West Pakistan Municipal Committee (Octroi) Rules, 1964 has been cancelled, has challenged in this Constitution Petition the order of cancellation of licence passed by Respondent No. 1 dated 3‑3‑1987 and the subsequent order dated 10‑5‑1987 passed by respondent No.2 in appeal confirming the order of respondent No.1 The petitioner has also challenged a consequential order passed by Assistant Director Octroi (Investigation? under Rule 83(e) directing the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.2,332 towards actual octroi plus Rs.23,320 being ten times composition fee within seven days of the receipt of the notice date 9‑4‑1987. Learned counsel for the petitioner firstly, contended that the order dated 3‑3‑1987 cancelling the licence of the petitioners is wholly without jurisdiction as it was passed without issuing any notice to the petitioner and without hearing them although the reasons stated for cancellation of licence was the alleged violation of the term of licence. It is also contended that as the initial order was without jurisdiction the subsequent order passed in appeal on 10‑5 1987 by respondent No.2 confirming the first order is equally without jurisdiction. On the same ground the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the subsequent notice dated 9‑1‑1987 issued by the respondent demanding a sum of Rs.2,332 towards actual octroi and a further sum of Rs.23,320 being alleged composition fee within 7 days from the receipt of notice is equally without jurisdiction and lawful authority as this order was also passed without affording any opportunity to the petitioner and without hearing them. It is not only admitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the aforesaid two orders were passed by respondent without hearing the petitioner but the learned counsel also very candidly drew our attention to an unreported decision in the case of M/s. Paramount Spinning Mills v. K.M.C. (C.P. No.148 of 1987) decided by a Division Bench of this Court on 29‑4‑1987 in which in similar circumstances the order passed by K.M.C. was declared without lawful authority. In view of the aforesaid decision and the view of our conclusion that the two orders were 11 passed by the respondent without hearing the petitioner we declare both the orders as having been passed without lawful authority and we accordingly quash the same. The respondents are however, at liberty to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with the law if it is still available to them. There will be no order as to costs. H.B.T./D‑45/K Petition allowed/order quashed,