1989 P Cr (PLP)

The facts leading to the filing of this revision against the orders of Special Judge Anti‑Corruption, Punjab, Lahore, Camp at Kasur, are that petitioner Mst. Khurshid Bibi had got a case registered against the respondents for an offence under section 420/467/468/471, P.P.C. and section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. After due investigation, the challan was submitted in Court. The learned trial Court, before framing of the charge, passed an order under section 249‑A, Cr.P.C. and acquitted all of them. The petitioner, challenges the said order.

2. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that section 249‑A, Cr.P.C. was not available at the stage when the learned trial Court acted under it by acquitting the respondents. Submits that the police after due investigation had submitted the challan wherein 19 witnesses had been cited, therefore, the learned trial Court should have recorded the statements of some of the witnesses before passing the order of acquittal. Submits that an inquiry by a Magistrate against the respondents was held wherein he gave the opinion that prima facie a case for offences mentioned above appeared to have been committed, yet the learned trial Court never went through the findings of the inquiry before passing the impugned judgment. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner have been controverted by learned counsel for the respondents who submits that under section 249‑A, Cr.P.C., trial Court can pass an order of acquittal at any stage which includes the stage before framing of the charge. Submits that cogent reasons have been given by the learned trial Court to which no exception can be taken.

3. I have heard the learned counsel ad perused the record. The allegation against the respondents is that respondent No.4 was the Naib‑Tehsildar, whereas respondents Nos. 5 and 6 were Girdawar and the Patwari respectively. The remaining three respondents are real brothers of the petitioner. Petitioner and respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were daughter and the sons of one Nizam Din who died in 1960 leaving behind 384 Kanals and 14 Marlas of land. By means of Mutation No. 59, the petitioner as well as respondents Nos. 1 to 3 inherited the land in accordance with their shares. In the year 1966, a mutation was entered in the revenue record by respondent No. 6, Patwari, which was verified by respondent No.5, Girdawar and attested by respondent No.4, Tehsildar, on the same day, wherein it was said that the petitioner Mst. Khurshid Bibi had sold her entire share in favour of her three brothers for a consideration of Rs.1,

000. Said Mst. Khurshid Bibi at the time of attestation of the mutation was identified by one Murad Khan, Lambardar. She accepted the sale‑transaction before the Tehsildar and also admitted having delivered the possession. Later, on 15‑12‑1977, an agreement was executed between petitioner and respondents Nos.1 to 3 wherein they agreed to give three Acres of land from their shares to their sister, the petitioner, as gift. The said agreement was also signed by the petitioner. In the said agreement it was further mentioned that the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were exclusive owners of 33 Acres of land. On 6‑8‑1981, the petitioner gave an application to the Collector for the registration of a criminal case against her brothers respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to the effect that she never sold her land to them in the year 1966 and the mutation was got attested in collusion with the respondents Nos. 4 to 6 by producing a fictitious lady. The petitioner in 1981 had challenged the sale which was made on 15‑6 1966. Surprisingly, in the agreement whereby she had accepted three Acres of land from her brothers also had a mention that the said brothers respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were exclusive owners of the entire land left by their father, but at that stage she never challenged the sale which was made much earlier than the agreement of gift. I have gone through the entire file, but there is no evidence available which could prove that the sale alleged to have been made in the year 1966 by the petitioner was a fraudulent transaction. The trial Court has rightly pointed out that the only witness who could prove this fact, was the Lambardar who had since died. On the contrary, there is ample documentary evidence which indicates that the petitioner was aware of the said sale but she never challenged the same. She decided to challenge the same for the first time 15 years after its execution. I have gone through the judgment and rind that cogent reasons have been given by the learned trial Court for acquitting the respondents under section 249‑A, Cr.P.C. For what has been discussed above, I find no merit in the petition which is accordingly dismissed. M.Y.H./K‑143/L Petition dismissed.