1970 PLP 195 (PLC)

S: 16(1‑A) [as inserted by West Pakistan Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance (VIII of 1968)]‑Appeal‑Limitation

Period during which Appellate Tribunal does riot exist‑To be ex--cluded‑Date of receipt of record by Appellate Tribunal lrein$ mulch after constitution of Appellate Tribunal‑Appellant, despite opportunity, failing to apply for condonation of delay under S. 3, Limitation Act, 1908‑Appeal, in circumstances, dismissed as time‑barred Abdul Majeed Qureshl for Appellants. A, R. Farooqi for Respondent No.

1. Date of hearing: 30th April 1969. This is an appeal against an award dated 15th April 1968. A preliminary objection has been taken that the appeal is time-- barred. The facts necessary for the disposal of the objection are these.

2. The appellant applied for a copy on 6th May 1968. It was ready on 7th May 1968. The appellant, however, took the copy on 15th May 1969, and filed an appeal in the High Court on 21st May 1968. A Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 19th January 1969, forwarded the appeal to the Tribunal for disposal in accordance with the law. This order was passed by the High Court on the ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the appeal after the promulgation of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, which came into force on 8th March 1968. The appeal was received by the office of the Tribunal on 25th January 1969.

3. Two questions arise from the facts narrated above. In the first place, the question is A Nether an appeal was competent in the High Court after the repeal of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1969. It was held by a Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Ahmad Husain v.. Messrs Sartaj Industries F. A. O. 137 of 1968 that 's the appeal, after the promulgation of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, on 8th March 1968, was not competent in the High Court. The second question is that if the appeal in the High Court was not competent after 8th March 1968, can it be said to have been validly filed on 25th January 1969, after the receipt of the record of the appeal from the High Court.' Taking a very liberal view, the best that can be said is that the appeal was presented before the Tribunal on 25th January 1969., The next question in this connection is as to whether B the appeal can be said to be Within time. In this connection, reference may be made to section 2 of the West Pakistan industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinances, 1968. It runs as under :‑ "in the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 (West Pakistan Ordinance IV of 1968), hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance, after subsection (1) of section 16, the following subsection shall be inserted, namely :‑‑ (1‑A) Ins the computation of the period for appeal under sub section (1)‑‑‑ (a) the period during which there is no Tribunal appointed or constituted under section 17 shall be excluded ; and (b) the limitation therefore shall be governed by the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908).

4. It is clear from the above that for the computation of the period of ‑appeal under 6ubsection (1) of section 1,6 of th Ordinance of 1968, the period during which there was so Tribunal shall be excluded. The Tribunal was appointed on 16th September 1968. If the Memorandum of Appeal had been received by 16th September 1968, from the High Court, taking a most liberal view it could be said that it was validly presented and was within time. I gave an opportunity to the learned Representative for the appellant on 3rd April 1969, on an objection that the appeal was beyond time, to file an application. Under section 5 of the Limitation Act. When the matter came up before me on 29th April 1969, I again adjourned it for one day and took up the matter on 30th April 1969. Mr. Majeed Qureshi, the (earned Representative for the appellant, for on reason or the other did not file an application under section. 5 the Limitation Act, to condone the delay from 16th September 1969 to 25th January 1969. The appeal is clearly time‑barred and it is accordingly dismissed.