1988 PLP 1861 (SCMR)
Malik TAHIR AHMAD and others — Petitioners Versus TANSEEF-UR-REHMAN and others — Respondents
| Citation | 1988 PLP 1861 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | High Court |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Afzal Zullah and Ali Hussain Qazilbash, JJ |
| Parties | Malik TAHIR AHMAD and others — Petitioners Versus TANSEEF-UR-REHMAN and others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1988 PLP 1861 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1988 PLP 1861 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Muhammad Afzal Zullah and Ali Hussain Qazilbash, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1988 PLP 1861 (SCMR) (Malik TAHIR AHMAD and others — Petitioners Versus TANSEEF-UR-REHMAN and others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Hafiz S.A.Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court and Manzoor Elahi, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.
- Nemo for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 6th July, 1988.
- Hafiz S.A.Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court and Manzoor Elahi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.
Headnotes / Summary
(Against the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, dated 24-5-1988 in R.S.A. No.133 of 1987).
S.3(5)--Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)--Pre-emption-- Sale by mutation in pursuance of decree for specific performance-- Whether pre-emptible--Transfer of land by judgment-debtor/vendor through mutation in compliance with the decree itself being a sale which had not been excluded by definition of sale in S.3(5) of Act (I of 1913), held, was rightly pre-empted--Leave to appeal refused. Nur Ahmad v. B. Muhammad Ibrahim P L D 1953 Lah. 470 rel.
Judgment & Decree
Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 6th July, 1988. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑Leave to appeal has been sought by the vendees' side in a pre‑emption matter, against the dismissal of their Regular Second Appeal by the High Court. The sale pre‑empted by respondents' side, was successfully effected between the vendor and the vendee by a mutation, in pursuance of a decree for specific performance. Learned counsel has contended that such a sale is not pre‑emptible. The same point was raised before the learned trial Court. It was repelled with the observation that it was "legally not correct. The answer is to be found in Nur Ahmad v. B. Muhammad Ibrahim PLD 1953 Lah.
470. This was also conceded in principle on behalf of the defendants (present petitioners)". In first appeal also the position was the same including the concession of the petitioners' side. The High Court dealt with the argument as follows:‑
"Learned counsel for the appellants thus vaguely argued that unless a registered sale‑deed was executed the decree for specific performance could not be treated to have been complied with and it was only that registered sale‑deed which could be pre‑empted. I am afraid the contention has no legal foundation. In the decree for specific performance the vendor was directed to sell the property in accordance with the agreement. Since the sale of land could be legally made orally through mutation and the vendor could comply with the decree without the decree‑holder having taken recourse to execution of proceedings, therefore, the transfer of land by the judgment- debtor/vendor through mutation in compliance with the decree was itself a sale: therefore it was rightly pre‑empted." After hearing the learned counsel we have no reason to disagree with the learned lower Courts nor we have any reason to differ with the decision of the Lahore High Court in the full Bench case of Nur Ahmad. Amongst others, it has the support of the language used in subsection (5) of Section 3 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act. The sale through registered deed or mutation in consequence of a decree for specific performance has not been excluded by definition of sale in Section 3(5). No other point has been pressed. Leave to appeal accordingly is refused. M.I. /T‑26/S Petition dismissed.