1970 PLP 162 (PLC)

The scope of review is very limited. An application for review cannot be treated as a Memorandum of Appeal against the Court's order. An application for reviews would lie if the applicants discovered any new and important matter or evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by them at the time when the order was passed or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for other sufficient reason. A. Majeed for Applicants. Mnsood Mirza for Respondents. Date of hearing: 16th September 1969. These are four applications for review of my order dated 10th May 1969. The circumstances giving rise to these applications briefly put are these.

2. The Management made an application under section 30(2) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the repealed Ordinance), for permission to terminate, the services of the five persons, to the Second West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi. The Court granted the permission. The four applicants came in appeal before me. Mr. A. Majeed, the learned Representative for the appellant in appeal raised the points, namely, (1) that the application under section 30(2) of the repealed Ordinance was not maintainable for a simple discharge or termination of service, (2) that the provision of Standing Order 13(4) is mandatory in nature and contravention of the same would vitiate the order of dismissal, and (3) that in the absence of the particulars of allegations made in paras.5, 6 and 7 of the application under section 30(2) of the repealed Ordinance, the appellants were not in a position to clear their conduct. I considered all the points and dismissed the appeal.

3. Mr. A. Majeed, the learned Representative for the applicants has raised two points in support of his four applica tions for review. He contended, in the first place, that the provisions of Standing Order 15(4) read with section 37(2) of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, is mandatory, the applicants having not been charge‑sheeted by the Management, the order terminating their services was not legal.

4. In the second place, it was contended that the Labour Law in India being somewhat different from that in Pakistan, the cases relied upon by the Tribunal, therefore, has no application.

5. The scope of review is very limited. An application for review cannot be treated as a Memorandum of Appeal against that order that I passed on 10th May 1969. An application for reviews would lie if the applicants discovered any new and important matter or evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be A produced by them at the time when the order was passed or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for other sufficient reason. The two grounds, which I have already enumerated above taken by Mr. Majeed are prima facie beyond the scope of Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. I hold accordingly and dismiss the four applications.