2004 PLP (S (PLC(CS))

JAVED IQBAL, J.

This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment dated 11-2-2000 passed by the learned Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, whereby the appeal preferred on behalf of petitioner has been dismissed and order dated 12-12-1994 by Superintendent of Police Mianwali dismissing the service of petitioner has been kept in tact.

2. Precisely stated the facts of the case are that petitioner was found gambling and resultantly a case under sections 5 and 7 of the Prevention of Gambling Act, 1977 was registered against him vide F.I.R. No. 163, dated 11-11-1994. Before the conclusion of trial he was dismissed from service as a result of disciplinary action initiated against him as contemplated in the Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975 by Superintendent of Police, Mianwali vide order dated 12-12-1994. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was rejected by Deputy Inspection-General of Police, Sargodha on 9-9-1996 and his revision petition was also dismissed by Inspector-General Police by means of order dated 19-11-1997. The petitioner, however, was acquitted from the above mentioned criminal case under section 249-A Cr.P.C. but the other co-accused namely Akbar, Fiaz, Ahmad Sher, Ahmad Khan, Ghulam Ali, Muhammad Ali, Ijaz, Abdul Rasheed, Sher Muhammad and Raza Muhammad pleaded guilty. They were convicted and sentenced to pay fine of Rs.2000 each.

3. Heard Mr. Muhammad Hussain Awan, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioner who mainly argued that after acquittal from criminal case the question of any further penalty under the Punjab Police (E&D) Rules does not arise which amounts to double jeopardy. The learned Advocate Supreme Court also contended that the departmental authority should have waited for result of criminal case as simultaneously no disciplinary proceedings could have been initiated.

4. After having gone through the entire record and perusing the judgment impugned we are not at all impressed by the above mentioned contentions which appear to be merit less and fallacious. The initiation of disciplinary action and criminal proceedings are not inter dependant which could have been initiated simultaneously and brought to their logical end separately with different conclusions. The acquittal in a criminal case would have no bearing on disciplinary action which was initiated on account of inefficiency and grave misconduct by invoking the provisions as contemplated in rule 3(a) and (b) of the Punjab Police (E&D) Rules, 1975'. The learned Advocate Supreme Court when asked as to whether the petitioner could have been absolved from charges of "misconduct and inefficiency" as a result of acquittal in the criminal case, no satisfactory answer could be given. This is well-entrenched legal position that criminal proceedings do not constitute a bar for initiation of disciplinary proceedings under the relevant (E&D) Rules. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum as laid down in the following authorities:- Arif Ghafoor v. Managing Director (PLD 2002 SC 13), Dy. I.G. Police v. Anis-ur-Rehman Khan (PLD 1985 SC 134), Muhammad Ayub v. Chairman, Electricity Board, WAPDA Peshawar (PLD 1987 SC 195), Muhammad Tufail v. Asstt. Commissioner/Collector (1989 SCMR 316), Muhammad Nazir v. Superintendent of Police (1990 SCMR 1556), Talib Hussain v. Anar Gul Khan (1993 SCMR 2177), Muhammad Izharul Ahsan Qureshi v. P.I.A.C. (1994 SCMR 1608) and Nawaz Khan v. Federal Government (1996 SCMR 315).

5. There is no denying the fact that no inquiry was conducted which aspect of the matter has been clarified in the show-cause notice that in view of overwhelming evidence it was not considered essential to hold a regular inquiry which in no way has caused any prejudice against the petitioner to whom proper opportunity of hearing was afforded. There is no justification whatsoever to differ with the findings of Superintendent of Police Mianwali duly concurred by Deputy Inspector General of Police (Appellate Authority), Inspector-General Police (Revisional Authority) arid affirmed by the learned Service Tribunal. The learned Advocate Supreme Court could not point out any infirmity or illegality in the judgment impugned. No question of law of pubic importance is involved on the basis whereof leave could be granted. In sequel to the aforementioned discussion the petition being meritless is dismissed and leave refused. S.A.K./K-94/S Leave refused.