2002 PLC (C (PLP)

‑‑Ss. 4 & 6‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (19 rat. ‑‑‑Constitutional petition‑‑‑Appointment of Chairman of Karachi Port Trust‑‑‑Challenged in collateral proceedings‑‑Petitioner who was Secretary of Trade Union, had challenged the appointment of respondent as Chairman of Karachi Port Trust and alleged that he having not been appointed under provisions of S.6 of Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886, could not pass order terminating the services of employees‑‑‑Petitioner had further contended that under S.6, Government was empowered to appoint a Chairman Board of Trustees but by Notification issued by the Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, the contract appointment of the respondent was extended as Chairman Karachi Port Trust thus he was not appointed in terms of said S.6 of the Act ‑‑‑Validity‑‑ Contention of petitioner was repelled, because a slight misdescription in the name of office could never be a ground to vitiate the appointment of a person as long as the appointment of. qualified person had been made by an Authority competent to do so‑‑‑Even if the appointment of respondent was found to be illegal, the order passed by him earlier would be protected by the doctrine of de facto and in any case if the appointment of respondent was presumed to be illegal the same could not be challenged in collateral proceedings. Pir Sabir Shah v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 738 and Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 161 ref. Petitioner in person. Mehmood Abdul Ghani for Respondent. The petitioner No. 1is a trade union and the petitioners Nos.2 to 4 were employed in the respondent No.

1. They were served with the show‑cause notices as to why their services should not be terminated and such action has, inter alia, been called in question by way of this petition. Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the petitioners Nos.2 to 4 had simultaneously availed an alternative remedy by way of seeking prevention of an unfair labour practice before the National Industrial Relations Commission (N.I.R.C:) and an., interim order in their favour was also passed. The same, however, has been vacated on 1‑8‑2000 but the proceedings are still pending. Accordingly this petition is not maintainable. Mr. Mughees Ahmed Samdani the petitioner No. 1, however, has argued that some of the grounds raised in this petition cannot be urged before the N.I.R.C. and therefore, the petition is not liable to be dismissed on the grounds of an alternative remedy being available. He has pointed out that one of the ground raised is that the respondent No.2 was not lawfully appointed Chairman of the respondent No. 1 and therefore, could not pass order leading to termination of services of employees of the latter. In this context he has referred to sections 4 and 6 of the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886. According to section 4 of the Act a body corporate to be called "the trustee of the Port of Karachi" was to be constituted and under section 6 of the Government was empowered to appoint a Chairman Board of Trustees. However, by Notification dated 27‑11‑1999 issued by the Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan the contract appointment of Vice‑Admiral (R) Khalid Muhammad Mir was extended as "Chairman Karachi Port Trust". According to Mr. Samdani the respondent No. 2 was not appointed Chairman of the Board of Trustees in terms of section 6 of the Act.

2. We regret was find no force in this contention. A slight misdescription in the name of office can never be a ground to vitiate the appointment of a person as long as the appointment of qualified person has been made by an authority 'competent to do so. Moreover, even if the appointment of the respondent No.2 be assumed to be illegal the same cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings as has been repeatedly held by the Courts in several cases including the full Court judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pir Sabir Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1994 SC 738). In any event, even if the appointment of the respondent No.2 is found to be illegal the order, passed by him earlier would be protected by the doctrine of de facto as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 161). For the foregoing reasons we find no substance in this petition and dismiss the same in limine. The petitioners Nos.2 to 4 however will be free to move any appropriate forum for redress of the grievances. H.B.T./O‑2/K Petition dismissed.