2002 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

"Since the intervening period in respect of the applicant P.C. 3823 Mujeeb‑ur‑Rehman of District East has already been decided by the Competent Authority as leave without pay, as such, there is no need to interfere with the orders passed earlier." Upon the passage of above orders, the appellant has come in appeal before this Tribunal with the prayer that the respondents may be directed to release the salary arrears of the appellant including all benefits and they further be directed to pass order for sending the appellant for the intermediate course.

5. Accordingly, the points for determination have been construed as under:‑‑ (i) Whether action under rule 12.21 of Police Rules, 1934, contemplated by the Senior Superintendent of Police, District East, Karachi was correct? (ii) Whether the claim of the appellant for payment of arrears during the intervening period that he remained out of service is bona fide? (iii) Whether the appellant's claim for being sent to the intermediate course is justified?

6. After the perusal of record and proceedings coupled with hearing the arguments at length made by the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Assistant Advocate‑General for respondents, we are of the firm view that the answer to the above points for determination in the Negative for the following reasons:‑‑ (i) The action contemplated by the Competent Authority under rule 12.21 of the Police Rules, 1934 appears to have been rightly taken in accordance with such established principles of law. Rule 12.21 provides that "A constable who is found unlikely to prove an efficient police officer may be discharged by the Superintendent (SSP) at any time within three years of enrollment. There shall be no appeal against an order of discharge under this rule." The appellant stepped in service on 1‑1‑1990 and was discharged from service on 3‑11‑1992. The discharge was resorted within the stipulated period of three years. No personal grudge against the concerned authority has been indicated by the appellant. So much so that such authority has not been made party in the instant appeal. In other words, it amounts to establish that the discharge orders alongwith serious allegations contained therein have a tacit acceptance on the part of appellant.

7. The record has unequivocally established the fact that the appellant rose out of slumber after waiting for over 9 long years to conceive the mercy petition for his reinstatement. It is not believable that the appellant merely sat at home and doing nothing to earn his bread and butter. But because he had several other engagements or commitments which did not move him to come up with the aforesaid mercy petition instantly or within reasonable span of time. We are fully conscious of the fact that a needy person who has nothing else to do except to earn his livelihood through some professional career would wait for that long a period to come out with the said mercy petition.

8. In fact, the very act of accepting the mercy petition by respondent No. 1 at such outrightly belated stage transpires an act of questionable nature. Whereas; the rule 12.21 of the Police Rules, 1934 does not provide for such act; the reinstatement orders (Annexure B‑1) passed by respondent No.2 lacks indication of any rules, law and legal provisions to reinstate a discharged officials under the aforesaid rules. How such barrier has been crossed after over nine years seems highly questionable under the circumstances. The conjunctures of creating justification by way of seeking clearance from certain intelligence agencies after nine years is obviously an afterthought. The judicial appreciation of such conjunctures seems not easily digestable. (ii) & (iii) Having elucidated the point (i), there remains hardy any material aspect left to be discussed for the remaining two points for determination.

9. Accordingly, we are of the candid and firm opinion that the appellant should thank his starts for having been shown too great a mercy by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 for restoring his service without much ado. The appellant merely wants to have a cake and eat it too. His claim to seek arrears for the intervening period during which he did all other activities except rendering services to the Police Department for which he was initially appointed would certainly pose challenge to the element of dedication and discipline of Government service, in general, and, the police force, in particular. No canon is traceable nor is in our knowledge to award pecuniary benefits to a person who was not available for during the passage of nine long years. It would be advisable for the appellant to remain content, with what he has already received from the blue. In view of the foregoing, we are of the firm consideration that the instant appeal has no force, whatsoever. Neither legal nor moral. Consequently, it is dismissed with no order to costs. Given under our hands and Seal of this Tribunal the 9th day of October 2001 at Karachi. H. B. T./80/K(Sr.Trib.) Appeal dismissed.