P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

CONSTANTINE, J.--‑In 1944 the respondents‑plaintiffs entered into a contract with the Governor‑General‑in‑Council, represented by the Assistant Director, Military Farms, Northern Circle, Lahore Cantonment, whereby he agreed to supply milch cattle to the Military Farms, Malir, on certain terms. On 2nd July 1947, he filed a suit against the Governor-General‑in‑Council for the balance of money due to him for cattle which he had supplied in accordance with the contract. No point arises regarding the amount found due ; the only point for our decision is whether the liability under this contract attaches to the Federation of Pakistan or the Dominion of India. It is agreed that the solution depends upon subsection (1) of section 8 of the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order, 1947. This reads :‑ "8 (1) Any contract made on behalf of the Governor-General in Council before the appointed day shall, as from that day,‑ (a) if the contract is for purposes which as from that day are exclusively purposes of the Dominion of Pakistan, be deemed to have been made on behalf of the Dominion of Pakistan instead of the Governor‑General‑in‑Council ; and (b) in any other case, be deemed to have been made on behalf of Dominion of India instead of the Governor‑General in Council and all rights and liabilities which have accrued or may accrue under any such contract shall, to the extent to which they would have been rights or liabilities of the Governor‑General, be rights or liabilities of the Dominion of Pakistan or the Dominion of India, as the case may be." Mr. Castellino contends that clause (a) requires that the purposes shall still be in existence, i.e., still in the process of execution, after the appoined day and that since the purposes of the contract had been executed and fulfilled before the appointed day, clause (a) does not apply. We do not agree with this contention. In our opinion what clause (a) requires is that we should see what are the purposes of the contract and if after the appointed day those purposes, whether fulfilled or not fulfilled, are exclusively purposes ofl the Dominion of Pakistan, then we must apply clause (a). Harris C. J. said in Province of West Bengal v, Midnapore Zamindary Co. Ltd. (A I R 1950 Ca1. 159). "It is clear from this Article that if the purposes for which the contract was made were, after the appointed day, the exclusive purposes for the new Province of West Bengal then the Province of West Bengal would be liable." Similarly in the State of Punjab v. L. Mohan Lal Bhayana (A I R 1951 Pb. 382) the contract had been finished in August 1946. The contract had been for work done in connection with Damama Water Storage Scheme in the District of Gurgaon in the East Punjab. There also the learned judge said the contract was for purposes which are exclusively the purposes of the Province of East Punjab. These were cases upon the later provision of the same section of the same order, and the provisions were such that the reasoning in these cases is exactly appropriate to our case. Mr. Castellino argued, that the cattle were supplied to Military farms for the purpose of supplying milk to troops stationed in the vicinity of Malir and that in those days among the troops were soldiers who are now Indian nationals, citizens of the United Kingdom and probably citizens of other countries, and therefore, the purpose of the contract was not and is not exclusively a purpose of the Dominion of Pakistan. We do not think this argument has any validity. As the learned Judge pointed out, this argument over‑looks the words, "As from that day". Clause (a) requires you to consider the purposes from the point of time after the appointed day and not before the appointed day. After the appointed day the supply of cattle to the Military Farm at Malir was the exclusive purpose of the Dominion of Pakistan (whatever the nationality of the troops) : for it is undeniable that the Military Farm vested in the Dominion of Pakistan. We therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. A. H.??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.