PLD 1957

P L D 1957 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

DIN MUHAMMAD‑Appellant Versus THE HIGH COURT OF WEST PAKISTAN,

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
1st February 1957
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 1957 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members N/A
Parties DIN MUHAMMAD‑Appellant Versus THE HIGH COURT OF WEST PAKISTAN,
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This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

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The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.

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Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1957 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP) (DIN MUHAMMAD‑Appellant Versus THE HIGH COURT OF WEST PAKISTAN,). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Dharam Das, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court (M. Hafiz Ahsan, Advocate, Supreme Court, with him), instructed by M. Siddiq, Attorney for Appellant.
  • S. A. Mahmud, Advocate, Supreme Court, instructed by Ijaz Ali, Attorney for Respondent.
  • Between 13th July 1955 and 16th August 1955, the appellant applied twice to the Chief Court of Sind for enrol ment as an Advocate of that Court under the rules and regulations made by the Sind Bar Council. In both these applications he stated that he had been dismissed from Government service and that an appeal from the order of dismissal was pending in the Chief Court. The order on each of the applications was that it would be considered after the appellant's appeal had been decided.
  • There is no provision in the High Court Rules and Orders that a person dismissed from Government service cannot be enrolled as a pleader, and there are several instances where persons who had been so dismissed were granted licences to practise as advocates or pleaders. What the rules require is that the application for enrolment should state the facts which may operate as a disqualification, the precise words of the relevant rule being that the applicant shall state "disqualifications i.e., whether he was ever declared a tout, convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, or dismissed from Government service, the date of conviction or dismissal being given." It is not alleged that this rule was not complied with or that the appellant had fraudulently or dishonestly suppressed any material fact which was to be considered by the Court at the time of passing orders on the application for enrolment. The applicant had clearly stated that he had been dismissed from Government service and that an appeal was pending. The attention of the learned Judge was drawn to the fact of dismissal and it was pointed out to him that if the appellant's appeal from dismissal failed, he would not be considered to be a fit person to be enrolled. The learned Judge read the relevant rule but formed the opinion that no valid ground existed for withholding the certificate and ordered the issue of a licence to the appellant. Under the rules the dismissal was not an absolute bar to enrolment and did not operate as an automatic disqualification. The question whether despite his dismissal from Government service the appellant should or should not be permitted to practise as a pleader was a matter which the learned Judge had to determine in the exercise of his judicial discretion and he did determine it in favour of the appellant, and no law has been shown to us under which another Judge of the Court or the Judges in a meeting could subsequently revoke an order made by a competent Judge where it is not suggested that the order had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation or by misleading the Judge. In the absence of any such allegation, the appellant could only be dismissed for a subsequent fault after a regular enquiry under the Legal Practitioners Act. Thus the withdrawal of the appellant's licence not being in due, course of law we are constrained to set aside the order of the High Court.

Headnotes / Summary

Enrolment‑Dismissal from Government service, not an absolute bar‑Order of enrolment once made can be set aside only on a subsequent fault after fresh inquiry‑Whether order of one Judge cart be revoked by another Judge‑Rules and Orders of High Court (West Pakistan, r. 3 (c), Chap. 6‑D.

Judgment & Decree

MUHRMMAD MUNIR, C. J.

This is an appeal, with the permission of this Court, from an order of the High Court o'' West Pakistan, withdrawing the licence which had been issued by that Court to Appellant Din Muhammad to practise as a pleader in the Court of the District Judge, Hyderabad died the Courts Subordinate thereto. Before his enrolment the appellant had been serving as a Nazir to a Civil Court at Hyderabad when a departmental enquiry against him, on allegations of misconduct, led to his dismissal by the District Judge, Hyderabad, on 18th December 1954. He appealed from his dismissal but the appeal has not as yet been disposed of. Between 13th July 1955 and 16th August 1955, the appellant applied twice to the Chief Court of Sind for enrol ment as an Advocate of that Court under the rules and regulations made by the Sind Bar Council. In both these applications he stated that he had been dismissed from Government service and that an appeal from the order of dismissal was pending in the Chief Court. The order on each of the applications was that it would be considered after the appellant's appeal had been decided. On the absorption of the Sind Chief Court in the newly created High Court of West Pakistan constituted under the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, the appellant applied for enrolment as a pleader under the Legal Practitioners Act. In this application again he mentioned that he had been dismissed from Government service and that an appeal was pending. The office put up this application before Mr. Justice Muhammad Bakhsh Memon, who was acting as Administrative Judge, pointing out that the appellant had been dismissed from service and that if his appeal from the order of dismissal was rejected his case would fall within the mischief of rule 3 (c) of Chapter 6‑D of Rules and Orders and admission as a pleader would be denied to him. The learned Judge asked the office to place the relevant rule before him and after perusing it, passed the following order on 8th February 1956 :‑ "I do not think there is any reason to withhold the certificate. Let the certificate be issued to him after he furnishes the non judicial stamps of Rs. 25." Consequently a pleader's certificate was issued to the appellant under a formal order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench. It appears that this enrolment case came to the notice of Mr. Justice Muhammad Bachal, another Judge of the High Court of West Pakistan at Karachi, who instructed the Additional Registrar at Karachi to write to the Registrar of the High Court of West Pakistan at Lahore to enquire from Mr. Justice Akhlaque Hussain and Mr. Justice Kaikaus, who after hearing some arguments had adjourned the appellant's appeal from the order of dismissal, whether in view of the fact that one of the charges against the appellant being that he had sent anonymous letters against Judges the case did not fall within the mischief of rule 3 (c) of Chapter 6‑D and whether the licence granted to him should not be recalled. This letter was placed before the Judges of the High Court at Lahore in a meeting and it was decided by them that the order enrolling the respondent as a pleader being irregular because his appeal was pending at the time of his enrolment, his licence should be withdrawn and his application for enrolment should be considered after the disposal of the appeal. In pursuance of this resolution the appellant's licence to practise as a pleader was revoked by a formal order made by Mr. Justice Muhammad Bachal. The sole question to be determined in this appeal is whether this order of Mr. Justice Muhammad Bachal revoking the appellant's licence was within jurisdiction. There is no provision in the High Court Rules and Orders that a person dismissed from Government service cannot be enrolled as a pleader, and there are several instances where persons who had been so dismissed were granted licences to practise as advocates or pleaders. What the rules require is that the application for enrolment should state the facts which may operate as a disqualification, the precise words of the relevant rule being that the applicant shall state "disqualifications i.e., whether he was ever declared a tout, convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, or dismissed from Government service, the date of conviction or dismissal being given." It is not alleged that this rule was not complied with or that the appellant had fraudulently or dishonestly suppressed any material fact which was to be considered by the Court at the time of passing orders on the application for enrolment. The applicant had clearly stated that he had been dismissed from Government service and that an appeal was pending. The attention of the learned Judge was drawn to the fact of dismissal and it was pointed out to him that if the appellant's appeal from dismissal failed, he would not be considered to be a fit person to be enrolled. The learned Judge read the relevant rule but formed the opinion that no valid ground existed for withholding the certificate and ordered the issue of a licence to the appellant. Under the rules the dismissal was not an absolute bar to enrolment and did not operate as an automatic disqualification. The question whether despite his dismissal from Government service the appellant should or should not be permitted to practise as a pleader was a matter which the learned Judge had to determine in the exercise of his judicial discretion and he did determine it in favour of the appellant, and no law has been shown to us under which another Judge of the Court or the Judges in a meeting could subsequently revoke an order made by a competent Judge where it is not suggested that the order had been obtained by fraud or misrepresentation or by misleading the Judge. In the absence of any such allegation, the appellant could only be dismissed for a subsequent fault after a regular enquiry under the Legal Practitioners Act. Thus the withdrawal of the appellant's licence not being in due, course of law we are constrained to set aside the order of the High Court. We allow the appeal but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. A. H. Appeal allowed.