1976 PLP 540 (PLC)

S. 37(3) read with Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, r. 1-Appeal-Appellate powers have to be conferred by statute:- Court cannot by implication assume power to entertain appeal-Appeal to Labour Appellate Tribunal lies only against an award or decision under S. 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969-Interim injunction granted by Labour Court restraining, commencement of strike-Not an award hence not appealable. R. N. A. lt. A. Adaikappa Chettiar and ano:her v. R. Chandersekhara Thevar P L D 1947 P C 279 distinguished. A. Majeed for Appellants. M. A. Khan for Respondent No. 1 Date of hearing: 5th February 1973. This is an appeal against an order of the learned Chairman of the Second Sind Labour Court, Karachi, dated 28th September 1972, whereby the learned Court granted an ad interim injunction restraining the appellant Union from resorting to strike. The question is as to whether an appeal lies under section 37 (3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, (hereinafter called the Ordinance). An appeal lies to the Appellate Tribunal only against an award given by the Labour Court or a decision under section 25-A A of the Ordinance. The order to be an award, must be a determination of an industrial dispute. Industrial dispute has been defined in 'the Ordinance to mean, "any dispute or difference between employers and employees or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is con cerned with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person." Restraining a party from going on strike cannot be, said to be a question relating to employment or no employment and, therefore, no appeal can lie therefrom. Under section 37(3) of the Ordinance, all decisions except award, or a decision under section 25-A of the Ordinance, by the Labour Court are filed. Mr. A. Majeed, the learned Representative for the appellant-Union, relied on a Privy Council case. R. N. A. R. 1. Adaikappa Chettiar and another v. R. Chandrasekhari Thevar (P L D 1947 P C 279) in support of his contention that an appeal lies against a decision under Order XXXIX, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that, "where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorized by such rules, . . . . " The contention of Mr. Majeed is that under the Code of Civil Procedure, i. e. under sec tion 104, an appeal would lie if an order is passed under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. I cannot accept this contention, on the face of positive and specific law under the Ordinance prohibiting the Appellate Tribunal to entertain an appeal against an order, except if it is an award or a decision under section 25-A of the Ordinance. It is well settled rule of law that appeal late power has to be conferred by statute The Court cannot by implication assume the power to entertain an appeal. I would, for these reasons, hold that no appeal lies. The appeal is dismissed.