2017 PLP (Trib (PTD)
Messrs SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LTD., KARACHI Versus C.I.R., ZONE-III, LTU, KARACHI
| Citation | 2017 PLP (Trib (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Jawed Zakaria, Judicial Member and Sikandar Aslam, Accountant Member |
| Parties | Messrs SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LTD., KARACHI Versus C.I.R., ZONE-III, LTU, KARACHI |
| Primary Law | (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2017 PLP (Trib (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2017 PLP (Trib (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Inland Revenue Appellate Tribunal bench comprising: Muhammad Jawed Zakaria, Judicial Member and Sikandar Aslam, Accountant Member.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2017 PLP (Trib (PTD) (Messrs SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LTD., KARACHI Versus C.I.R., ZONE-III, LTU, KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Arshad Mehmood, FCA for Appellant.
- Chaudhry Anwar, DR. for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
S. 131(5)
Grant of stay of recovery of tax demand by Appellate Tribunal
Stay of recovery demand by the Tribunal, could be granted, if it was proved that taxpayer was facing hardships or financial constrains
In the present case, it was not proved by the taxpayer, that the department had initiated any coercive measures for recovery of the demand
Stay could not be granted on the basis of general rule, but applicant had to prove its case
Stay could be granted if party seeking stay had a prima facie case; that in case of refusal of stay party could suffer irreparable loss and the balance of convenience or inconvenience, if the stay was not allowed
Section 131(5) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, unequivocally provided that the Tribunal could stay the recovery proceedings, if the recovery proceedings caused undue hardship to the taxpayer
Applicant/taxpayer had failed to make out a case for grant of stay as no hardship was seen to have been caused to the taxpayer
Applicant/taxpayer had filed vexatious and frivolous applications and by doing so, he had not only wasted the time of the court, but also dragged unnecessarily the revenue
Taxpayer having not shown that any coercive measures were being initiated by the department, neither any notice of hardship was issued, nor any recovery proceedings were seen to have been initiated by the department against the taxpayer, application for grant of stay was rejected by the Tribunal in circumstances.
S. 131
Powers of Appellate Tribunal
Scope
Power to grant stay, pending appeal before Tribunal
Powers of Appellate Tribunal, were of widest amplitude in dealing with appeals before it
Tribunal had the power of granting stay during the pendency of the appeal before it
Stay would be granted for a limited and specified period
No automatic stay
Mere filing of and pendency of appeal, would not operate as suspension or stay
No provision in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 existed that an assessment would become provisional or non-existent with the filing of an appeal against it
Mere fact of pendency of an appeal would not operate as stay of execution, nor would it affect the executability of the decision appealed against
Matter of grant of stay, no doubt was one of discretions with the Appellate Tribunal, but such power was to be exercised judicially
Primary consideration, should be "undue hardship caused to the taxpayer"
Appellate Tribunal was obliged to form opinion that the recovery of tax in question would cause undue hardship to the taxpayer.
S. 131(5)
Stay, grant of by the Tribunal
Points to be considered before grant of stay/injunction were; (a) granting of any injunction under the rule, was purely within the discretion of the court; said discretion should be exercised in favour of the party, who would come with clean hands; (b) injunction was a form of equitable relief; it was to be issued in aid of equity and justice, but not in aid of injustice; in order to obtain an interim relief, the applicant, had not only to establish that he had strong prima facie case, but also to show that the balance of convenience, was in his side and that he would suffer irreparable injury unless he was protected during the pendency of his appeal; applicant had to prove that he would be caused undue hardship, if necessary proceedings were not stayed; and (c) where no serious controversy was raised in the application for stay, mere allegation without producing any prima facie material to establish the same or pointing out circumstances to justify it, could hardly lead to the conclusion that there was a prima facie case justifying grant of injunction.