2025 PLP 1215 (PTD)
Messrs UMAR TEXTILES Versus FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE and others
| Citation | 2025 PLP 1215 (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | Sindh High Court |
| Bench Members | Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry, J |
| Parties | Messrs UMAR TEXTILES Versus FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE and others |
| Primary Law | Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2025 PLP 1215 (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2025 PLP 1215 (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Sindh High Court bench comprising: Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2025 PLP 1215 (PTD) (Messrs UMAR TEXTILES Versus FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE and others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- ----Ss. 21(2) & 21(5) [as inserted by the Finance Act, 2024]---Sales Tax Rules, 2006, R. 12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Issuance of notice by tax Authority---Assailing of notice by filing suit---Temporary injunction, seeking of---Factual controversies---Right of appeal, availability of---Effect---Registered person / Company (plaintiff) filed suit, invoking original jurisdiction of High Court, to challenge a 'pre-suspension notice' issued to plaintiff by the Commissioner-Inland Revenue ('Commissioner') for initiating suspension/blacklisting proceedings ('impugned notice')---Plaintiff prayed for a temporary injunction to restrain the Commissioner from taking coercive action against the plaintiff---For seeking temporary injunction, grounds taken by the petitioner / plaintiff (registered person) included that the impugned notice was without the signature of the Commissioner, which was received when date of hearing had passed, and that the allegation in the impugned notice that the petitioner / plaintiff made purchases from suspended or blacklisted vendors was belied by the tax profile of those vendors which showed that at the relevant time those vendors were not suspended nor blacklisted---Validity---The impugned (pre-suspension ) notice was essentially a notice to show-cause against suspension of sales tax registration---It was a precursor to blacklisting proceedings---By virtue of subsection (5) of S. 21 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which had been inserted by the Finance Act, 2024, a remedy was now available to the Plaintiff before the Chief Commissioner in the event an order of suspension was passed against the plaintiff/ petitioner---Excepting a jurisdictional defect, a Court of law did not ordinarily interfere with a show-cause notice issued by a statutory authority lest such interference stifled the exercise of fact-finding and provided an escape from special statutory proceedings and remedies---The grounds urged by petitioner / plaintiff for interference were based on the facts of the case and did not relate to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner in issuing the impugned notice---Said facts had been laid by the petitioner / plaintiff before the Commissioner who had yet to pass any order thereon---The temporary injunction sought in effect required (this/High) Court to determine facts instead of the Commissioner---Petitioner /plaintiff did not bring forth any exception for interfering with the impugned notice---Application for grant of temporary injunction, was dismissed, in circumstances.
Headnotes / Summary
Taimur Ali Mirza for Plaintiff. Nemo. for Defendants.
Judgment & Decree
ADNAN IQBAL CHAUDHRY J.
The suit has been brought to challenge a 'pre-suspension notice' issued to the Plaintiff by the Commissioner-IR for initiating suspension/blacklisting proceedings under section 21(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with Rule 12 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 [impugned notice]. By C.M.A. No. 634/2025, the Plaintiff prays for a temporary injunction to restrain the Commissioner-IR from taking coercive action against the Plaintiff.
2. Learned counsel drew attention to the fact that the impugned notice is without the signature of the Commissioner-IR and the date thereon appears as "__-12-2024". He submitted that while the date of hearing was fixed as 27-12-2024, the notice was received by the Plaintiff on 10-01-2025. However, the copy of the impugned notice filed with the plaint is not a photocopy of the original notice but appears to be a document scanned by a smartphone. Counsel submitted that this was the only copy provided to him by the Plaintiff. It may well be that the date and signature put in hand are not visible in the scanned copy. Counsel should have made inquiries from the Plaintiff before using such a copy. As regards the date of receipt of the impugned notice, since the Plaintiff has already submitted a reply and it is not averred that the Commissioner-IR has denied him a hearing, the date of receipt loses significance.
3. Learned counsel then submitted that the allegation in the impugned notice that the Plaintiff made purchases from suspended or blacklisted vendors is belied by the tax profile of those vendors which shows that at the relevant time those vendors were not suspended nor blacklisted; and that some of the purchases mentioned in the notice have already been dealt with under a previous show-cause notice against which recovery was made from the Plaintiff. Learned counsel therefore submitted that the impugned notice was mala fide.
4. Heard learned counsel and perused the record. The impugned 'pre-suspension' notice is essentially a notice to show-cause against suspension of sales tax registration. It is a precursor to blacklisting proceedings. By virtue of subsection (5) of section 21 of the Sales Tax Act, which has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2024, a remedy is now available to the Plaintiff before the Chief Commissioner in the event an order of suspension is passed against the Plaintiff.
5. It is by now settled that excepting a jurisdictional defect, a Court of law does not ordinarily interfere with a show-cause notice issued by a statutory authority lest such interference stifles the exercise of fact-finding and provides an escape from special statutory proceedings and remedies.1 The grounds urged by learned counsel for interference are on the facts of the case and do not go to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner-IR in issuing the impugned notice. Those facts have been laid by the Plaintiff before the Commissioner-IR who has yet to pass any order thereon. He may well agree with the Plaintiff. The temporary injunction sought in effect requires this Court to determine to those facts instead of the Commissioner-IR.
6. In view of the foregoing, since the Plaintiff does not bring forth any exception for interfering with the impugned notice, C.M.A. No. 634/2025 is dismissed. MQ/U-3/Sindh Application dismissed.