1994 PLP 349 (PLC)
ABDUL SAMAD KHAN Versus Messrs PAKISTAN PETROLEUM LIMITED, KARACHI
| Citation | 1994 PLP 349 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal, Sindh |
| Bench Members | Agha Ali Hyder, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | ABDUL SAMAD KHAN Versus Messrs PAKISTAN PETROLEUM LIMITED, KARACHI |
| Primary Law | Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1994 PLP 349 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1994 PLP 349 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Sindh bench comprising: Agha Ali Hyder, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1994 PLP 349 (PLC) (ABDUL SAMAD KHAN Versus Messrs PAKISTAN PETROLEUM LIMITED, KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- S.P. Lodhi for Appellant.
- Muhammad Humayun for Respondent
- Date of hearing: 30th January, 1994.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑‑Grievance petition‑‑‑Limitation‑‑‑Request earlier made by employee through his letter for amendment in his date of birth was finally turned down by employers giving sound reasons‑‑‑After turning down request, employee after about five months repeated his request which was also turned down ‑‑‑Grievance notice given to employers by employee, though was within time if computed from subsequent order made by employers on repeated request of employee but was time‑barred if computed from earlier order of employers‑‑‑Subsequent letter was just a repetition of what had been urged by him in his earlier letter‑‑‑Grievance notice and grievance petition filed by employee, both were time‑barred in view of fact that limitation period for redress of grievance would begin once cause of action had accrued and in the present case it had accrued from order of employers passed earlier.
Judgment & Decree
Succinctly stated the circumstances in which this appeal has been preferred are as follows.
2. The petitioner was employed with the respondent in the year 1964 as a Comptist and in due course had been promoted as Head Comptist. In his declaration at the time of appointment he had mentioned his date of birth as 17‑2‑1930: The age of superannuation in the respondent‑Company is 58 years. The service of an employee could be extended up to 60 years if he was found to be physically fit. The petitioner was, therefore, due to retire on 16‑2‑1988, but his services were extended for one year and once again by another year.
3. It was after he had crossed the age of superannuation as prescribed by the Company, to be precise on 26‑2‑1989, that he wrote a letter to the Personnel Officer of the respondent‑Company that he was born on i7‑2‑1933 and the date of birth furnished by him earlier i.e. 17‑2‑1930 was through inadvertence. In support of the same he submitted a copy of the National Identity Card, a copy of Birth Certificate from the Municipal Board, a Passport and Age Certificate from the Civil Surgeon, Karachi. The request was turned down inter alia in the following words:‑‑ "Having examined the matter, we invite your attention to the declaration made by you in the month of September, 1969 when you confirmed and recorded your year of birth as `1930'. Accordingly, on the eve of your attaining 58 years age on 31‑12‑1988, you were medically examined by C.M.O. and were advised vide letter of even number dated 22‑12‑1988 that your services have been extended for one more year beyond 58 years."
4. The request for amendment in his date of birth was repeated five weeks later on 14‑5‑1989, in which it was stated that he could not avail of the opportunity of correction in 1969 as he could not lay his hand on the documents which he had referred to earlier. A reply was sent on 30‑1‑1990 in which it was mentioned that there was no occasion to go into the matter once again and his attention was drawn to the earlier letter rejecting the same. It was, thereafter, that the petitioner had sent a grievance notice on 21‑2‑1990 and a petition before the Labour Court followed.
5. The petitioner was his own witness and Farrukh Mirza appeared on behalf of the respondents.
6. The Labour Court found that the petition was barred by time and the retirement was in accordance with law. It, therefore, dismissed the. petition culminating in this appeal.
7. It is clearly borne out that the representation in regard to the amendment in the age had been turned down in unequivocal terms in the reply dated 4‑4‑1989 referred to above. The letter that followed was just a repetition of what had been urged by the appellant in February. The cause of action had, therefore, accrued to him on the outright rejection on 4‑4‑1989. The grievance notice had been given by him on 21‑2‑1990.
8. It is a settled law that the limitation period for redress of grievances under section 25‑A of I.R.O., 1969, begins once the cause of action had accrued. It had accrued on 4‑4‑1989 and not on the reply to the subsequent letter. The remedies should have been, therefore, sought within a period of 5‑1/2 months therefrom. There was no room for a second letter on the subject. Ostensibly it is beyond time and the appeal is liable to be disposed of on that ground alone.
9. I might as well mention that among the other documents the appellant has produced a certificate from the Principal of a College to the effect that he had studied up to the 7th Class in his Institution. In his declaration the appellant had mentioned that he was having Matriculation Degree. Nothing has been said as to why he could not obtain a copy of the same, from the Board.
10. There is no merit in the appeal. I will, therefore, uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal. H.B.T./2275/Lb.S. ????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Appeal dismissed.