PLC 1982

1982 PLP 221 (PLC)

GULZADA AND ANOTHER Versus Messrs SILVER COTTON MILLS LTD., HYDERABAD

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1982 PLP 221 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Bench Members Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal
Parties GULZADA AND ANOTHER Versus Messrs SILVER COTTON MILLS LTD., HYDERABAD
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1982 PLP 221 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1982 PLP 221 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1982 PLP 221 (PLC) (GULZADA AND ANOTHER Versus Messrs SILVER COTTON MILLS LTD., HYDERABAD). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Judgment & Decree

The 2 appellants, Gulzada and Abdul Ghafoor, who were employed in the Silver Cotton Mills Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the company, as a Weaver and Line Jobber respectively, were dismissed from service, with effect from 14thOctober, 1978, for committing riotous and dis orderly behaviour during working hours at the premises of the company on 21st June, 1978, in consequence of which the work of the mills was disturbed for several hours. The appellants challenged the orders of their dismissal before the learned VIth Labour Court but their grievance petitions were dismissed by the learned Labour Court by its separate but similar decisions given on 12thMarch, 1981. The appellants have now filed separate appeals to this Tribunal against the said decisions.

2. The sole ground on which Mr. Fasahat Hussain Rizvi, the learned counsel for the appellants, assailed the impugned decisions of the learned L‑Sour Court was that the Enquiry Officer was prejudiced against the appel lants to the extent that not only he did not give them a fair opportunity of leading defence, but he did not even record the statements of the wit nesses in the domestic enquiry in a fair manner but did so in a manner which was favourable to the Management. The learned counsel, however, had to concede that neither the appellants made any application to the management to change the Enquiry Officer, nor was any complaint made by them to the management or the Director of Labour Welfare or any other authority about the alleged partial or unfair conduct of the Enquiry officer. At least no such application or complaint is on the record of these 2 cases. Mr. Fasahat Hussain Rizvi, however, sought to base his objections to the enquiry proceedings on 2 circumstances, which are indi cated in the enquiry proceedings themselves. The first is the reply given by the appellants in the domestic enquiry to the question whether they had taken part in the affray which took place in the mills premises on 21st June, 1978. To this question, both the appellants replied that they would not make any statement in this behalf till a reply is given to them by the company. The reference is to the expected reply to the letter, dated 1st August, 1978, in which a demand was made by the appellants for supply of copies of the statements of the witnesses examined in the domestic enquiry so that they could consult their legal advisor for the purposes of, preparation of the crossexamination of the witnesses. It tray, however, be pointed out that it is neither the requirement of law of natural justice that copies of statements of witnesses recorded is the domestic enquiry be furnished to the workman against whom the enquiry proceedings are being taken, particularly where the witnesses have been examined in the presence of the workman concerned as in the present case. The non‑supply of the copies of the statements of the wit nesses recorded in the domestic enquiry, in the circumstances, cannot be said either to indicate bias on the part of the Enquiry Officer or to have in any way hindered the appellants from making their defence or to have invalidated the enquiry proceedings. An examination of the enquiry proceedings discloses tat the appellants at every stage tried to delay the proceedings by making all sorts of frivolous applications. The impartiality and the fairness of the Enquiry Officer in conducting the domestic enquiry cannot be doubted in view of the repeated adjournments which were granted by him to the appellants at their request and the further fact that although when the witnesses were examined the appellants declined to cross examine them, the Enquiry Officer re‑summoned the witnesses for the purposes of crossexamination on the application of the appellants but once more the appellants declined to cross‑examine them.

3. The second circumstance from which Mr. Fasahat Hussain sought to establish bias on the part of the Enquiry Officer was that no witness in defence was examined by the Enquiry Officer. It may, however, be pointed out that the appellants were asked by the Enquiry Officer whether they wanted to lead defence but they declined to do so again on the plea that they had not been supplied copies of the statements of the witnesses. This stand of the appellants has already been discussed and held to be without any substance. A perusal of the enquiry proceedings establishes that there was material evidence in support of the charges against the 2 appellants that they were involved in an affray in the mills' premises on 20th June. 1978, in which they hurled abuses at members of the rival union arid used brickbats and dundas against them and in consequence of this unruly behaviour the working of the mills had to be stopped for several hours. As the witnesses testifying against the appellants were not cross‑examines nor any defence was led by the appellants, the Enquiry Officer rightly held that the charges against the appellants were fully established. Looking to all the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the enquiry was properly conducted and that there is no material on the record from which it could be concluded that either the Enquiry Officer was prejudiced against the appellants or that the enquiry suffers from any such a defect as to make it invalid.

4. For the foregoing reasons, I would concur in the findings of the learned Labour Court and would dismiss both the appeals in limine.