2005 PLP 134 (SCMR)
FATEH KHAN and others — Petitioners Versus SULTAN KHAN — Respondent
| Citation | 2005 PLP 134 (SCMR) |
| Forum / Court | Supreme Court of Pakistan |
| Bench Members | Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, C.J. and Javed Iqbal, J |
| Parties | FATEH KHAN and others — Petitioners Versus SULTAN KHAN — Respondent |
| Primary Law | Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII of 1990) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2005 PLP 134 (SCMR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII of 1990) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2005 PLP 134 (SCMR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, C.J. and Javed Iqbal, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2005 PLP 134 (SCMR) (FATEH KHAN and others — Petitioners Versus SULTAN KHAN — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Akram Ch. Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.
- Abdul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court with Ejaz Muhammad Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 20th September, 2004.
- 2. Heard Mr. Muhammad Akram Chaudhry, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of the petitioners at length. We are not persuaded to agree with the prime contention of the learned counsel that there was a complete vacuum w.e.f. 1-8-1986 to 28-3-1990 as during that period no pre-emption enactment was in existence and therefore, the period of limitation will be four months and on this score alone, the suit for pre-emption should have been dismissed for the simple reason that section 36(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII) of 1990 made it abundant clear that "all the decrees, judgments or orders dismissing the suits of pre-emption, instituted or pending during the period from 1st August, 1986 to 28th March, 1990, in which the right of pre-emption was claimed as is available under this Ordinance, shall be of no legal effect, and such suits, on an application made by the aggrieved person, within sixty days of the commencement of this Ordinance, shall subject to subsection (2), be decided afresh according to the provisions thereof." The period termed, as "vacuum" has been saved and covered by the provisions as enumerated in section 36(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII) of 1990. Admittedly the suit was restored under section 36(2) of the Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII) of 1990 wherein the limitation period has been prescribed as 60 days and therefore, it could not have been dismissed on the point of limitation.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, dated 28-10-2002 passed in Civil Revision No. 190 of 1995).
S. 36(2)
Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)
Period termed as `vacuum'
Suit and appeal of pre-emptor were dismissed by Trial Court and Appellate Court respectively on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation
High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision on merits
Plea raised by the vendee was that there was complete vacuum with effect from 1-8-1986 to 28-3-1990 as during that period no enactment on pre-emption was in existence, therefore, period of limitation would be four months
Period termed as `vacuum' had been saved and covered by the provisions as enumerated in S.36(2) of Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance, 1990
Suit was restored under S.36(2) of Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance, 1990, wherein limitation period was prescribed as 60 days
Trial Court could not have dismissed the suit as barred by limitation
No infirmity, perversity or illegality could be pointed out by vendee warranting interference by Supreme Court as the judgment passed by High Court was well- reasoned
Leave to appeal was refused.
Judgment & Decree
JAVED IQBAL, J.
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 28-10-2002 whereby revision petition preferred on behalf of the respondent has been accepted and judgments/decrees of both the Courts below were set aside and the suit preferred on behalf of respondent was directed to be treated as pending in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Pindi Ghep, District Attock.
2. Heard Mr. Muhammad Akram Chaudhry, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of the petitioners at length. We are not persuaded to agree with the prime contention of the learned counsel that there was a complete vacuum w.e.f. 1-8-1986 to 28-3-1990 as during that period no pre-emption enactment was in existence and therefore, the period of limitation will be four months and on this score alone, the suit for pre-emption should have been dismissed for the simple reason that section 36(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII) of 1990 made it abundant clear that "all the decrees, judgments or orders dismissing the suits of pre-emption, instituted or pending during the period from 1st August, 1986 to 28th March, 1990, in which the right of pre-emption was claimed as is available under this Ordinance, shall be of no legal effect, and such suits, on an application made by the aggrieved person, within sixty days of the commencement of this Ordinance, shall subject to subsection (2), be decided afresh according to the provisions thereof." The period termed, as "vacuum" has been saved and covered by the provisions as enumerated in section 36(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII) of 1990. Admittedly the suit was restored under section 36(2) of the Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII) of 1990 wherein the limitation period has been prescribed as 60 days and therefore, it could not have been dismissed on the point of limitation.
3. No infirmity, perversity or illegality could be pointed out by the learned counsel warranting interference in the judgment impugned which is well-reasoned. The petition being/meritless is dismissed and leave refused. M.H./F-17/S Petition dismissed.