SCMR 1974

1974 PLP 3 (SCMR)

MUHAMMAD YOUSAF BEG‑Petitioner Versus CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND Another — Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K‑122 of 1973, decided on 10th September 1973.
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1974 PLP 3 (SCMR)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members N/A
Parties MUHAMMAD YOUSAF BEG‑Petitioner Versus CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND Another — Respondents
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1974 PLP 3 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1974 PLP 3 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1974 PLP 3 (SCMR) (MUHAMMAD YOUSAF BEG‑Petitioner Versus CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND Another — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Yousuf Rafi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.
  • Nemo for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing : 10th September 1973.

Headnotes / Summary

(On appeal from an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan made on the 24th of May 1973, in Writ Petition No. 627 of 1972). Constitution of Pakistan (1973) --‑Art. 185(3) ‑ PracticeSupreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with discretionary order of High CourtOrder neither perverse nor palpably unjust or capricious‑Leave to appeal refused.

Judgment & Decree

Date of hearing : 10th September 1973. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.‑On the 18th of May 1965, the petitioner shipped 50 bales of Pakistan cotton waste from Karachi to Hong Kong. The consignment was subjected to a detailed check up at Hong Kong on the 28th of July 1.965, and 154 lbs. of raw opium was recovered therefrom. As a result of this, the Hong Kong Police arrested the petitioner on the 1st of August 1965, and charged him for importing and possessing opium. He was tried by a competent Court at Hong Kong which acquitted him on the 5th of November 1965. Thereafter, the petitioner returned to Karachi and on the 3rd of May 1966, was served with a show‑cause notice from the Collector of Customs under section 167(8‑b) of the Sea Customs Act for exporting opium outside Pakistan. Contrary to the provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930, he was tried along with three other persons and convicted under section 167(8‑b) and 167(8:) of the Sea Customs Act. The petitioner was imposed a penalty of Rs. 20,

000. The petitioner appealed against this order but the Central Board of Revenue rejected his appeal on the ground that he had failed to deposit the penalty in accordance with the provisions of section 189 of the Sea Customs Act. He then went in revision to the Central Government, but his revision was also rejected. Finally, he invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court at Karachi under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution. His petition was admitted to regular hearing but his prayer for stay of realisation of the penalty was refused. The main petition is still pending in High Court but the petitioner seeks special leave to appeal from the order refusing the stay. The learned counsel appearing in support of this petition concedes that the admission of the petition under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution for regular hearing does not by itself amount to a stay of the realisation of the penalty but contends that since the admission of the main petition indicates the existence of a prima facie case, the High Court should have granted the stay because the realisation of the fine would cause irreparable harm and injury to the petitioner. We are not impressed by this argument. It was in the discretion of the High Court to grant the interim relief prayed for or not. The High Court has in the exercise of its discretion refused to do so. The question is whether we should interfere with such a discretionary order. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with such discretionary orders unless it is shown that the order is palpably unjust or capricious or perverse. We are not satisfied that the order suffers from any one of these defects. There is, therefore, no ground for interference. Since the main petition under Article 201 has been admitted for regular hearing the authorities concerned will, we feel sure, stay their hands till the disposal of the petition. At the same time, we hope that the High Court will take up the hearing of the main petition at an early date. With these observations, this petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.