1990 PLP 487 (PLC)

‑‑‑S. 2(xxviii)‑‑‑West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1908), S.2(i)‑‑‑"Workman"‑‑‑Employee whether a "workman"‑‑‑Criteria‑‑‑Mere designation is immaterial but actual duties is relevant factor‑‑‑Supervisor admittedly doing skilled manual work by operating machines and working as dyefitter and pattern maker, held, was a workman notwithstanding his designation as supervisor. Abdul Hakim Awan for Appellant. Sh. Ezad Masood for Respondent. Date of hearing: 28th June, 1987. This is an appeal directed against the decision dated 31‑3‑1987 recorded by learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.7, Gujranwala whereby the grievance petition of the appellant given under section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 has been returned to him on the ground that he not being covered by the definition of 'workman' the Labour Court had no jurisdiction.

2. The appellant is a supervisor in the respondent industries. On the point of workman the appellant did not produce any documentary evidence and contented himself by appearing as his own witness and examining Muhammad Sarwar PW‑

1. PW‑1 deposed that the appellant used to work on drill machine and press machine with his own hands. The appellant deposed that he used to work as dye‑fitter, pattern‑maker and also used to work on drill machine and press machine with his own hands. He also said that additionally if any worker worked defectively, he used to set it right. He also said that he could not grant leave or charge‑sheet any employee. On behalf of the respondent documentary evidence Exs.P‑5, P‑7 and Exs.R‑8 to R‑25 were produced on the point. Ex.R‑5 and Ex.R 7 are not helpful to the respondent but Exs.R‑H to R‑25 show that the appellant used to get work done by other persons. The said documents bear his signatures. In the absence of evidence that the appellant had supervision or control over other persons, it is difficult to hold that his duties were supervisory. RW‑3 Muhammad Siddique in cross‑examination admitted that the appellant used to work' as dye‑fitter and pattern‑maker and also used to operate the drill machine and press machine. It is thus clear, that the appellant was doing skilled manual work. There is no documentary evidence to the effect that the appellant ever recommended or sanctioned leave of any worker or made report against any worker. A document 'Y' is on the record but since it was not exhibited in evidence, the appellant had no opportunity to meet it. No witness of the respondent stated that the application 'Y' was either recommended or sanctioned by the appellant. RW‑3 in cross‑examination made reference to the leave application 'Y' and said that Muhammad Sarwar had applied for leave through the said petition and (the witness) had refused it. He did not say that the appellant had recommended the said leave application. Since as admitted by RW‑3 that the appellant had been working as dye‑fitter, pattern‑maker and used to drill and press machines, he is covered by the definition of workman given in section 2(i) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The mere fact that the name of the post of the appellant is supervisor is not sufficient. Not the designation but the actual duties performed by a person are relevant for the decision whether he is or is not a workman. Ex.R‑5 and R‑7 are not germane to the case. Vide Ex.R‑5 all the supervisors including the appellant were asked to get the sections cleaned and to place specimen of the manufactured goods at their machines. Vide Ex.R‑6 the supervisors were asked to keep the place of their working neat and clean. Vide Ex.R‑7 the supervisors were directed to ask the workers to work in future carefully to avoid breakage. It is apparent that the above mentioned documents do not in any manner show that the appellant had supervisory duties. If at all the appellant had some supervisory duties, since admittedly he was doing skilled manual work by operating machines, therefore, he does not stand ousted from the definition of 'workman' either given in section 2(i) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 or section 2(xxviii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

3. As a result the appeal is accepted and setting aside the impugned decision the appellant is declared as a workman and the case is remanded for decision on merits. A.E./385/Lb.P