PLC 1992

1992 PLP 263 (PLC)

MUHAMMAD SHAHID MEHMOOD Versus MANAGING DIRECTOR, CYNAMID (PAKISTAN) LTD. KARACHI

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
Appeal No. KAR-342 of 1991, decided on 16th October, 1991.
Honorable Judges
Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1992 PLP 263 (PLC)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi Appellate Tribunal
Parties MUHAMMAD SHAHID MEHMOOD Versus MANAGING DIRECTOR, CYNAMID (PAKISTAN) LTD. KARACHI
Primary Law (a) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), (b) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1992 PLP 263 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: (a) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), (b) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1992 PLP 263 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Ahmed Ali U. Qureshi Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1992 PLP 263 (PLC) (MUHAMMAD SHAHID MEHMOOD Versus MANAGING DIRECTOR, CYNAMID (PAKISTAN) LTD. KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

(a) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968) (b) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)

Representation

  • Gohar Iqbal, Representative for Appellant.
  • Muhammad Humayoon for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 9th October, 1991.
  • 2. I have heard Mr. Gohar Iqbal, learned Representative for the appellant and Mr. Muhammad Humayoon, learned Advocate for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.

Headnotes / Summary

S.O. 1(1)(4)

Temporary employee

Employee admittedly was anointed on a job of purely temporary nature likely to be finished within a period not exceeding 8 weeks or on completion of job whichever was earlier

Mere fact that post of employee lasted for more than 8 weeks, would not alter the position or give a right to employee of becoming a permanent workman.

S.O. 12

Termination order

Authenticity of

Order terminating service of employee was in writing, was in accordance with terms of appointment of employee and reasons for termination were also mentioned therein-No mala fides was pleaded or proved by employee against employer

Such order could not be considered as colourful exercise of power of employer not Could the reasons given therein be considered to be, "not explicit".

Judgment & Decree

Muhammad Humayoon for Respondent. Date of hearing: 9th October, 1991. This is an appeal against the order of learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No. II at Karachi, dated 20-7-1991 whereby the grievance application of the appellant was dismissed.

2. I have heard Mr. Gohar Iqbal, learned Representative for the appellant and Mr. Muhammad Humayoon, learned Advocate for the respondents and have also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.

3. The admitted facts of the case are that the appellant was appointed, vide appointment order, Annexure `A' with effect from 17-4-1988 as Typist -cum-Clerk purely on temporary basis as the work was likely to be finished within period not exceeding 8 weeks. His services were terminated, vide order dated 19th December, 1988. The appellant claimed that he was working on, permanent vacancy and that he had put more than 3 months' service, and therefore he had acquired the status of permanent workman. He served the grievance notice upon the respondents and failing to get any relief, filed the grievance petition before the learned Labour Court.

4. The only question that requires for consideration is whether the appellant was appointed to work against the post of temporary nature or permanent nature. Clause (1) of the appointment order would be relevant anti is re-produced, as under:-- "Your employment will be effective from 17-4-1988 on purely temporary basis for work which is of an essentially temporary nature likely to be finished within a period not exceeding 8 weeks or on completion of the job whichever is earlier."

5. It is an admitted fact that Muhammad Tariq, brother of the appellant was working as a permanent employee of the respondent and that Muhammad Tariq had resigned on 22-8-1988. Mr. Arshad Hussain, Manager, (Administration) of the respondents has also admitted that all the manufacturing medicines are entered in Cardex register in Shipping Godown Department and that the manufacturing process of the company was in operation. He also admitted that the department concerned had approaches him that the appellant be posted in place of Muhammad Tariq, who had resigned. R.W. Mansoor Siddiqui, Materials Manager in the responder", establishment has admitted that the appellant used to maintain Card, Register. It is contended by the learned Representative for the appellant that the appellant was doing a job of permanent nature viz. maintenance of Cardex Register and a permanent vacancy was created after the resignation of 1 brother, Muhammad Tariq, therefore, he should be treated to have acquired the status of permanent workman. However, the fact remains that no order appointing the appellant in the vacancy caused by the resignation Muhammad Tariq was issued. His appointment order, Annexure `A' clearly shows that he was appointed against the work likely to be finished within period of 8 weeks. The mere fact that he was doing the work of maintaining Cardex Register would not alter his temporary appointment as under clan (3) of the appointment letter; he was to attend the duties as may be fixed notified from time to time. The appellant himself that in the company several clerks and typists were working permanently and that were issued letters of permanent appointment admits it. He also admitted that he have engaged in the temporary job but again he had changed his statement are stated it was not temporary, but, it was permanent job. However, he has admitted that no typist or clerk was appointed in his place. All these facts and I admissions of the appellant read with the appointment order would clearly show that the appellant was appointed against the post of temporary nature. A The mere fact that the post lasted for more than 8 weeks would not alter the position or give a right to the appellant of becoming a permanent workman. The appellant. contends that some of the officers had assured him that he would be appointed in the vacancy caused by the resignation of his brother. Even, if we accept that such assurance was given, it did not create any right enforceable under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

6. Mr. Gohar Iqbal has also contended that termination order was against the Standing Order 12(3). The relevant portion of the termination order may be reproduced as under:-- "We refer to clause 1 of your letter of appointment dated 17-4-1988 and wish to inform you that due to the completion of the temporary assignment for which you were employed your services are no longer required with immediate effect."

7. It would be seen that this order is, in writing and the reason for termination is also mentioned therein. Mr. Gohar Iqbal has relied upon certain decisions of this Tribunal where the reasons contained in the termination order were found not genuine but only colourable exercise of the powers of the employer, therefore, such order was held not to be in accordance with the Standing Order

12. It has also been held by this Tribunal in a number of cases that Standing Order 12(3) is of penal nature which takes away certain rights from the employee, therefore, it has to be strictly construed. However, in the instant case, the termination order is in accordance with the terms of the appointment of the appellant. No mala fides is pleaded or proved by the appellant against the respondent. There was no reason for the respondents to remove the appellant from service unless the job on which he was appointed was completed. Such order cannot be considered as colourful exercise of the power of the employer nor can the reasons given therein be considered to be not explicit'. I find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. H.B.T./1991/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.