2000 PLP 527 (YLR)

The deceased appellant filed a suit against the respondents. It was contended that the appellant had appointed respondent No. l as general attorney vide registered deed, dated 26‑12‑1972 but then cancelled the same on 19‑1‑1976. Despite cancellation of the power of attorney respondent No. l proceeded to execute an arbitration agreement in favour of his son, respondent No.2, on the basis thereof procured an award and got the same made rule of the Court vide decree, dated 24‑2‑1976. He sought a declaration that the said document be declared to be void. Respondent No. l filed a written statement wherein he stated that in fact the appellant had entered into an agreement with respondent No.1 on 5‑2‑1968, whereby he agreed to sell the suit land upon conferment of proprietary rights on him for a consideration of Rs.35,

000. Out of this amount he received a sum of Rs.15,000 and delivered the possession of the suit land to him. Thereafer, the said respondent No. 1 paid some more amount to the appellant which made upto a total of Rs.27,

500. To acknowledge the receipt thereof the petitioner executed another agreement, dated 26‑12‑1972 again binding himself to transfer the suit land upon conferment of proprietary rights. It was in this background that the general power of attorney dated 26‑12‑1972 was executed and got registered. The learned trial Court framed issues, recorded evidence of the parties. The suit was decreed vide judgment and decree, dated 17‑4‑1979 by a learned Civil Judge, Jauharabad. Respondents Nos. l and 2 filed an appeal which was heard by the learned District Judge, Sargodha who allowed the same vide judgment and decree, dated 23‑10‑1979.

2. Hafiz Khalil Ahmad, learned counsel for the appellants contends that the impugned judgment of the learned District Judge suffers from misreading of evidence and even the law has been misconstrued. None appears for the respondents.

3. I have gone through the record of the learned trial Court. I find that the pleas raised in the written statement are supported by the evidence on record. Exh. D.2 is the agreement, dated 5‑2‑1988, Exh. D.3 is the agreement, dated 26‑12‑1972 while Exh. D.1 is the general power of attorney, dated 26‑12‑1972, Exh. D.4, Exh. D.5, Exh. D.6 and Exh. D7 are the receipts whereby the appellants acknowledged receipt of various accounts from respondent No. 1, after agreement Exh. D.2 and before agreement Exh. D.3 as also after agreement, Exh. D.3. Learned District Judge is fully supported by the documentary evidence on record, in his observations that almost the entire consideration for the suit land stands paid by respondent No.1 to the appellants. He has very correctly held that the general power of attorney is coupled with interest and the appellant had no authority to revoke the same. The view formed by the learned District Judge also finds support from the case of Muhammad Din and 9 others v. Mst. Absar Fatima and others (1996 C L C 1979).

4. Learned counsel for the appellants very vehemently contended that the learned District Judge has misread the documents Exhs. D.2 and D.3. The precise contention of the learned counsel is that the agreement was in respect of colony land and the proprietary rights were yet to be conferred and as such the agreements are void. In the same sequence the learned counsel states that the observations of the learned District Judge that the possession and rights of respondent No.1 are protected under section 53‑A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, are contrary to law. This contention of the learned counsel, I am afraid, is also without force. In the case of Said Ali Shah v. Muhammad Shafi (1989 SCMR 1594) the Supreme Court of Pakistan reiterating the view that in the case of Ghulam Muhammad alias Ghulamoon v. Maula Dad and 6 others (1980 SCMR 314) held that an agreement of instant nature is not void but enforceable at law. The view has E been reiterated in the case of Muhammad Yaqoob v. Muhammad Arif (1991 SCMR 1783).

5. In view o the above discussion, the impugned judgment of the learned District Judge is in perfect accordance with law and is based on facts established on record through evidence. The Regular Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Q.M.H./M.A.K./N‑174/L Appeal dismissed.