1984 PLP 878 (CLC)
Munshi JAN MUHAMMAD‑Petitioner Versus IDA AND OTHERS‑Respondents
| Citation | 1984 PLP 878 (CLC) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | Gul Muhammad Khan and Abdul Waheed, JJ |
| Parties | Munshi JAN MUHAMMAD‑Petitioner Versus IDA AND OTHERS‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958)‑, JUDGMENT |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1984 PLP 878 (CLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958)‑, JUDGMENT as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1984 PLP 878 (CLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Gul Muhammad Khan and Abdul Waheed, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1984 PLP 878 (CLC) (Munshi JAN MUHAMMAD‑Petitioner Versus IDA AND OTHERS‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Ch. Hafeez Ahmed for Appellant.
- Kh. Ghulam Qadir for Respondent No. 1.
- Date of hearing : 18th October, 1983.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑ S. 30 (5) read with para. 1 of Schedule‑Letters Patent (Lahore), cl. 10‑Transfer of property‑House in question divisible‑Appel lant, held, would not be entitled to another house as purpose of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958) to rehabilitate mere displaced persons‑Such purpose having been served by impugned order of Single Judge interference declined in Letters Patent Appeal. Nemo for the Remaining Respondent. GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.‑The learned counsel challenges through this Letters Patent Appeal the order, dated 10th March, 1971, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1475‑R of 1964. It is contended by him that as the deceased‑respondent Idda had not filed any form for the transfer of the property, the lower authorities could not have transferred any portion to him.
2. After hearing the learned counsel we find that the Additional Settlement Commissioner, though found it as a fact that the respondent bad not filed any form, yet he allowed him the protection under section 30 (5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and refused to transfer the same portion to the appellant. In revision petition the Settlement Commissioner again heard the parties, took into consideration the plea of the indivisibility, raised by the appellant but refused to accede to his request for the transfer, again on the ground that the protection afforded by section 30 (5) could not be taken away.
3. The Settlement Commissioner, therefore, maintained the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and further observed that on repatriation of the respondent, the portion in his possession shall be disposed of either by restricted earmarking or auction between Jammu and Kashmir Refugees. The Settlement Commissioner thus indirectly accepted that the two portions are independent and separate houses and, therefore, we shall presume that the house stood divided. Admittedly, the appellate would not be entitled to another house in such a situation, under para. I of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. Again, the purpose of law to rehabilitate more displaced persons is served by the impugned order. Thus, an interference with the order of the learned Single Judge would mean to again displace a refugee for no valid or sound reasons. We, therefore, find no error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. He rightly concluded that mere desire to transfer the property, in such a situation, would be suf ficient and so the appellant would have no locus standi to object.
4. This appeal is consequently dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. M. Y. H. Appeal dismissed.
Judgment & Decree
Kh. Ghulam Qadir for Respondent No.
1. Nemo for the Remaining Respondent. Date of hearing : 18th October, 1983. GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.‑The learned counsel challenges through this Letters Patent Appeal the order, dated 10th March, 1971, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1475‑R of 1964. It is contended by him that as the deceased‑respondent Idda had not filed any form for the transfer of the property, the lower authorities could not have transferred any portion to him.
2. After hearing the learned counsel we find that the Additional Settlement Commissioner, though found it as a fact that the respondent bad not filed any form, yet he allowed him the protection under section 30 (5) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and refused to transfer the same portion to the appellant. In revision petition the Settlement Commissioner again heard the parties, took into consideration the plea of the indivisibility, raised by the appellant but refused to accede to his request for the transfer, again on the ground that the protection afforded by section 30 (5) could not be taken away.
3. The Settlement Commissioner, therefore, maintained the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and further observed that on repatriation of the respondent, the portion in his possession shall be disposed of either by restricted earmarking or auction between Jammu and Kashmir Refugees. The Settlement Commissioner thus indirectly accepted that the two portions are independent and separate houses and, therefore, we shall presume that the house stood divided. Admittedly, the appellate would not be entitled to another house in such a situation, under para. I of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. Again, the purpose of law to rehabilitate more displaced persons is served by the impugned order. Thus, an interference with the order of the learned Single Judge would mean to again displace a refugee for no valid or sound reasons. We, therefore, find no error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. He rightly concluded that mere desire to transfer the property, in such a situation, would be suf ficient and so the appellant would have no locus standi to object.
4. This appeal is consequently dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. M. Y. H. Appeal dismissed.