P L D 2003 Supreme Court 266 (PLP)
AAMIR IKRAM and 10 others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus DISTRICT HEALTH OFFICER, VEHARI and others‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | P L D 2003 Supreme Court 266 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Tanvir Ahmed Khan, Khalil‑ur‑Rehman Ramday and Falak Sher, JJ |
| Parties | AAMIR IKRAM and 10 others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus DISTRICT HEALTH OFFICER, VEHARI and others‑‑‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 2003 Supreme Court 266 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: (b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 2003 Supreme Court 266 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Tanvir Ahmed Khan, Khalil‑ur‑Rehman Ramday and Falak Sher, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 2003 Supreme Court 266 (PLP) (AAMIR IKRAM and 10 others‑‑‑Petitioners Versus DISTRICT HEALTH OFFICER, VEHARI and others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Anwar Ghuman, Advocate Supreme Court with Ch. Mehdi Khan Mehtab, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners.
- Dr. Muhammad Abid and Arshad Hussain Bukhari. Law Assistant for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 4th December. 2002.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment dated 5‑12‑2001 of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, passed in Appeals Nos.543/1999, 544/1999, 553/1999, 544/1999, 556/1999, 557/1999, 559/1999, 564/1999, 568/1999, 1822/1999 and 1823/1999 respectively). (a) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 4‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan 1973), Art. 212(3)‑‑‑Termination of service‑‑‑Service Tribunal by allowing petitioners' appeals ordered their reinstatement in service, but treated intervening period as extraordinary leave‑‑‑Validity‑‑‑Supreme Court had already granted back‑benefits to other employees of the same Department while accepting their petitions filed against the same impugned judgment‑‑‑Present petitioners were party in the impugned judgment of Tribunal and were aggrieved of the same, but had filed petitions now‑‑‑Observing that Department should have been magnanimous enough to have allowed such benefit to the present petitioners, Supreme Court converted petitions into appeal and allowed all back‑benefits to the petitioners. ‑‑‑‑Art. 212(3)‑‑‑Petition for leave to appeal‑‑‑Delay of 146 days. condonation of‑‑‑Supreme Court out of impugned judgment had already granted same relief to other employees of the same Department‑‑‑Delay in present matter should not come in the way of petitioners for dispensation of complete and substantial justice, who were sailing in the same boat.
Judgment & Decree
‑‑‑‑Art. 212(3)‑‑‑Petition for leave to appeal‑‑‑Delay of 146 days. condonation of‑‑‑Supreme Court out of impugned judgment had already granted same relief to other employees of the same Department‑‑‑Delay in present matter should not come in the way of petitioners for dispensation of complete and substantial justice, who were sailing in the same boat. Muhammad Anwar Ghuman, Advocate Supreme Court with Ch. Mehdi Khan Mehtab, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioners. Dr. Muhammad Abid and Arshad Hussain Bukhari. Law Assistant for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th December. 2002. TANVIR AHMED KHAN, J.‑‑Leave to appeal is sought against the judgment dated 5‑12‑2001 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), whereby the appeals filed by the petitioners against the termination of their services were accepted. However the intervening period was ordered to be treated as extraordinary leave. This matter was earlier assailed through Civil Petitions Nos.403‑L to 425‑L of 2002 by Sher Muhammad Shehzad and others against the same impugned judgment. This Court, through its judgment dated 3‑5‑2002, accepted the plea raised therein by the aggrieved persons and converted all the above petitions into appeals and allowed the same by granting them back benefits. The present petitioners were also party in the aforesaid judgment of the Tribunal and were aggrieved of the same. However, they have now tiled IA the instant petitions with a delay of 146 days. The departmental representative, who has appeared today on Court notice, has only opposed the present petitions on the ground of limitation. We have given our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the present case. This Court had already given judgment on 3‑5‑2002 in the aforesaid petitions, subject‑matter of which was the same as involved in these petitions, and granted back‑benefits to those employees in the above petitions. We are of the view that the department should have been magnanimous enough to have allowed the said benefit to the present petitioners as well without approaching this Court for which they have incurred colossal expenditure by tiling these petitions. It is pertinent to mention over here that earlier exception was taken to this very judgment by the functionaries of the respondent‑department against the reinstatement order passed by the Tribunal through Civil Petitions Nos.490‑L. 555‑L to 587‑L of 2002, all which were dismissed by this Court through judgment dated 26‑4‑2002. As far as delay in filing these petitions is concerned we are of the view that in the circumstances of this case when the same relief has been granted earlier by this Court to the other employees of the same department out of this very impugned judgment, the delay in this matter shall not come in the way of the present petitioners for dispensation of complete and substantial justice who were sailing in the same boat. Resultantly, for what have been stated above, the instant petitions are converted into appeals and the petitioners are allowed all the back benefits. However, there will be no order as to costs. S.A.K./A‑361/S?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Petitions allowed.