1987 PLP 2240 (MLD)

The Controller framed the issues:

"(1) Whether this case is not maintainable? (2) Whether there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the applicant and Opponents No.2 and 3? (3) Whether the opponents No.2 and 3 are sublettee of the premises in question? (4) Whether the opponents No.2 and 3 are defaulters in payment of rent? (5) What should the order be?' The issue No.1 was answered in the negative, issue No.2 was answered in the affirmative, Issue No.3 was answered in the negative issue No.4 was answered in the negative and the eviction application was dismissed. Mr.Mirza Mohammad Moqeem Baig the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the finding of the Learned Controller to the effect that the respondents 2 and 3 are statutory tenants of the appellant is contrary to law. The other contention is that the respondents 2 and 3 committed default in payment of rent with effect from 3-5-1971 till 31-10-1971. On the other hand Mr. Rehmat Elahi the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 has submitted that the order is in accord with the evidence on record. The Controller found that prior to the allotment of the premise in dispute in favour of the appellant, the respondents 2 and 3 were inducted as tenants by Mst.Mariam Bi and after the allotment in favour of the appellant, they became statutory tenants of the appellant. I am unable to agree with this finding. The respondents 2 and S were inducted as tenants by Mst.Mariam Bi in respect of the premises in dispute. They must fail to stand by such title as may be possessed by Mst.Mariam Bi. Therefore, with the cancellation of P.T.O. in favour of Mst.Mariam Bi, the tenancy created by Mst.Mariam Bi in favour of respondents 2 and 3 must necessarily come to an end for there is no method by which it can be said that respondents 2 and became the tenants of the appellant. Mr.M.M.Baig has contended that the respondent No.1 was the statutory tenant. This contention is devoid of force for more than one reason. Firstly, it is an admitted position that the respondent No.1 left the premises in 1956 and, secondly, on the date of its transfer in favour of the appellant, he was not in possession of the premises in dispute. The provisions of Section 18 of the Ordinance are not attracted to the facts of this case. Section 13-A of the repealed Ordinance or Section 18 of this Ordinance provide that where ownership of a premises in possession of the tenant has been transferred by sale, gift; inheritance (by any other manner) or by such other mode, the new owner shall send intimation of such transfer in writing by registered post to the tenant and the tenant shall not be deemed to have defaulted in payment of rent for the purpose of clause (ii) of subsection (2) of Section 15 of the Ordinance, if the rent due is paid within thirty days from the date when the intimation, should, in normal course, has reached the tenant. The section envisages a tenant, his landlord and transfer of ownership from that landlord to a new landlord. It has no application when the landlord is not a successor-in-interest of the old landlord. In my opinion transfer contemplated is in any manner whatsoever which would include an independent transfer in favour of a person and not necessarily a transfer between two landlords, the old and new. In my view transfer from one person to another is contemplated by Section 1 irrespective of its mode in between an existing tenant's landlord to a new landlord. The result is that respondent No.1 was not the recorded tenant of the appellant as on the date on which the appellant filed his eviction application because he had already parted with the possession in 1956. The respondents 2 and 3 were not the recorded tenants of the Custodian but they were inducted by Mst.Mariam Bi, as such they are not the tenants of the appellant. The eviction application stands dismissed as not maintainable against them. The appeal is dismissed with the above observations that there existed no relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellant and the respondents 2 and

3. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their oven costs. H . B . T . / P.-137 / K Appeal dismissed.