2000 PLP 2921 (YLR)

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that even though by an amendment made in section 18 of the Finance Act the entries in Table‑III have been omitted and customs duty has become leviable but a the petitioner had shipped his goods before the notification amending the Finance Act was issued the petitioner was not liable to pay any duty. Learned counsel was, however, confronted with section 31‑A of the Customs Act which provides for payment of duty notwithstanding any vested rights which may have been created in favour of any person on account of opening the letter of credit or having entered into firm contracts. 'this section reads as under:‑‑‑ "31‑A. Effective rate of duty.‑‑‑(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any decision of any Court, for the purposes of sections 30 and 31, the rate of duty applicable to any goods shall include', any amount of duty imposed under' section 18 and the amount of duty that may have become payable in consequence of the withdrawal of the whole or any part of the exemption or concession from duty whether before or after the conclusion of a contract or agreement for the sale of, such goods or opening of a letter of credit in respect thereof. (2) .. (a) (b) (c)

3. In reply learned counsel has argued that section 31‑A has no applicability inasmuch as the duty of which exemption is claimed has been levied by section 18 of the Finance Act, 1999 and is not a duty of customs under section 18 of the Customs Act and as such section 31‑A of the Customs Act was not applicable. In the submission of the learned counsel section 31‑A applies only to the, duties which are levied and recovered under the Customs Act and not under any other law like the Finance Act, 1999.

4. This contention of the learned counsel is based upon total misconception and proceeds on the assumption that the duty levied by the Finance Act, 1999 was not customs duty to which the Customs Act, 1969 had no application. Accumulative reading of the Finance Act, section 18 of the Customs Act, 1969 which is the charging section and section 31‑A of the Customs Act is destruction of the argument raised by the learned counsel. Section 18 of the Finance Act, 1999 clearly states that the duty which was being levied was customs duty. It is, therefore, idle on the part of the learned counsel to contend that the duty levied by section 18 of the Finance Act, 1999 was not customs duty. A reference to section 18 of the Customs Act, 1969 would show that the Act applies not only to the duties levied under the Act but also to the duties which have been levied by any other law for the time being in force which in the present case would be section 18 of the Finance Act, 1999. Section 31‑A of the Customs Act, 1969 applies notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and provides for payment of duty notwithstanding subsequent withdrawal of any Notification granting exemption. It destroys the vested right which had accrued to a person on account of his entry into a contract or opening letter of credit. From the above the inference which follows is that although the goods of the petitioner was not liable to pay customs duty when he entered into contract but exemption having been withdrawn before the goods could be cleared the petitioner cannot avail of the same. In view of what has been stated above, this petition has no force and is dismissed leaving the parties to hear their own costs. H.B.T./M‑295/L Petition dismissed.